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THEOLOGY OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God Within Boundaries

Jisoo Hong
Macalester College 12’

THEOLOGY OF GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP
Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God Within Boundaries

Though creating identity and belongingness under the sovereign requires an enclosure by
boundaries, the very act of drawing boundaries imposes inevitable challenges. The limitations of
the Westphalian system based on territorial boundaries are becoming more tangible with
transnational flows threatening individual’s sense of belonging and the state’s exercise of
sovereignty. Global citizenship is suggested as a possible “solution” transcending these
arbitrarily drawn boundaries. Nonetheless, my political theological examination concludes that
global citizenship is yet another translation of the human beings’ old wish for belonging to,
protection from, and unity under a “god,” albeit with new boundaries that differentiate us from
them.
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Preface
I was fifteen when I decided to leave my family in South Korea and come to the U.S.
alone. Now I have spent almost a third of my life here. Spending both my high school and
college years—the time people say you develop your perspectives and form your personality—in
the States, I have realized that I have become “assimilated.” Yet, I still cannot vote in elections. I
still don’t know what TV shows my friends watched in their early childhood. I don’t have
parents that help me move in and out or ask me to come home for holidays. I won’t be able to
legally stay here relatively soon after graduation, and eventually, I will have to go back home,
where those close to me constantly remind me how “American” I am. I’ve become too American
for Korea, and yet, I am too Korean for America. Who am I? I’ve become nobody definable. I
feel neither Korean nor American enough. I’d like to be “somebody.” I want to be a part of
somewhere.
My honors thesis, “Theology of Global Citizenship: Belonging Beyond Boundaries, God
Within Boundaries,” began from personal interest in a sense of belonging. Why is it such a big
problem for me that I feel I have no place to belong? Why am I so uncomfortable with being on
the borderline of two nationalities and cultures? It didn’t take me too long to figure out that it
was not just me that felt misplaced. It is not difficult to find those with an unsatisfied feeling of
belonging. Maybe it was not the right town you were raised in, not the right job or friend group
you had, not the right values and norms you were exposed to, or maybe it was that you grew out
of where you used to belong. In the end, every individual seems to experience a sense of
misplacement and to wish for a comforting sense of belonging at a certain point in his/her life, as
I can easily observe from my friends’ ceaseless worries about an uncertain future as they will
soon graduate and enter a new world without a specific place of their own.
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As someone deeply worrying about and craving for a secured sense of belonging, the
concept of global citizenship does sound appealing. If I could identify myself as a global citizen,
perhaps it could mean that I am “at home,” with somewhere to belong anywhere I go. In such a
way, with its aspiration to transcend nation-state boundaries, global citizenship ultimately
reflects humanity’s wish for a sense of belonging in today’s world, a world in which we
somewhat arbitrarily live with the Westphalian system in post-Westphalian times. The need for a
sense of belonging traces back to our first social interaction: parents, who play a god figure for
the young. A complete sense of belonging is one of the oldest human wishes that can never be
realized to a satisfying degree.
Yet, I simply cannot convince myself that global citizenship is “real” or that I must be a
global citizen. And my research on global citizenship confirmed that my feeling was not so
unfounded. But people kept talking about it. So I began the project in 2011 with the following
questions: What is global citizenship? Why do we want this? Could its possible realization be
better justified? Though it is not fully clear to me what global citizenship entails, I hope that
global citizenship somehow moves beyond the territorial state system and promotes something
more inclusive and accepting of the differences, the deviants, and the dynamics of life. This
honors thesis is written in an effort to further the current understanding of global citizenship and
also to point out the importance of emotional components—such as craving for a sense of
belonging and protection—in constructing and managing identity. With the anticipation that my
argument will neither persuade nor dissuade you of the possibility of actualizing of global
citizenship, I present my political theological analysis of global citizenship.
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Introduction
We live with the Westphalian system in a post-Westphalian era. The processes named as
“globalization” are speeding up as nation-states and other international actors like nongovernment organizations and transnational companies grow more independently. These
unceasing transnational flows directly reveal the limitation of rigid boundary drawing and
challenge the validity of key modern political concepts: state, sovereignty, and citizenship. In
response, some scholars feel the demand to construct a new political realm, reflecting the need
for more comprehensive forms of national or global political concepts. Among these concepts,
global citizenship is offered as a possible substitute for the current concept of citizenship based
on nationality and state boundaries, but its conceptualization nonetheless faces many challenges.
Compared to Westphalian citizenship, its biggest conceptual flaw seems to be the fact that it
cannot satisfy the prerequisite for establishing an identity, a sense of belonging, and sovereignty,
all of which demand the existence of the other: without the external other, it is not possible to
generate the internal us. But because global citizenship tries to move beyond the boundaries
distinguishing us from them by definition, neither its conceptualization nor its full realization
appears likely. This leads to a question: can the global citizenship discourse somehow defend
itself: explain its protocols with the absence of boundaries in order to create identity and a sense
of belonging?
Or, perhaps we should begin with a different, more foundational, question: why do we
need to belong somewhere? The answer to this question is simple. We always desire, and
furthermore need, a sense of belonging, through which we can define where we are and who we
are. Sigmund Freud would say that it returns to the idea of parents for children. Parents set
boundaries for children. Within these boundaries, they offer unbounded love and protection,
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whereas punishment awaits behaviors that are beyond the boundaries of appropriateness as a
means of proper guidance. Children grow up, but the parental love they received is not
forgettable; people are terrified even by the vague notion of losing those that shaped their lives.
We want our parents always to be there for us since the world without them seems just too
enormous and chaotic; this is unimaginable. Following Freud’s extension of this idea, it could be
said that we need an enclosure; whether it is a group, a society, or even a nation that one belongs
to, it defines the boundaries of what is acceptable and what is not within the enclosure. Once
allowed within the enclosure, we feel at home in the world—unbounded in a sense so long as we
stay within the boundaries. We are protected under the guidance of norms and rules of the
enclosure. What we find in the enclosure is the paradox of bounded unboundedness. Such
enclosure is a necessity for human beings.
Reflecting the basic human need for belongingness, such enclosure can be easily found in
every group, every society, and every civilization because it is the enclosure that permits the
existence of any social grouping. Each group depends on the enclosure for its own uniqueness,
norms, rules, identity, and cohesion among its members. Religion, one of the oldest inventions of
human beings, has drawn divine boundaries to construct morality, membership, and its parental
figure: God. Within the boundaries of religion, people find love and an ordering of the universe;
beyond the boundaries is a lawless, directionless disarray. Politics, another ancient human
activity, is not an exception. For instance, modern states have their own enclosure based on
territoriality. The enclosure provides the basis for national identity and sovereignty. Within its
jurisdiction, each state plays a parental figure, “offering” protection, guidance, and governance.
However essential for human beings, the act of drawing boundaries and creating the
enclosure inevitably sets limits which ultimately threaten the validity of the constructed being—
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God or state. In the case of Christianity, the problem was that there could not be a mutual
agreement on where the divine boundary ought to be drawn. After suffering a series of
devastating wars in Europe, the contention among various sects of Christianity hypothetically
removed religion from politics. The modern state system was a secular invention designed as a
solution (at least partially) for religious conflicts that were to be contained within the state
enclosure. Yet in post-modern era, this system faces problems. Though territorial boundaries
grant the state jurisdiction over its land, they cannot cope with growing transnational flows.
Unable to digest these flows, the fracturing enclosure is slowly revealing that the state is not the
absolute sovereign.
I contend that the growing discourse on global citizenship is a direct response to the
transgression of the territorial borders of the state by transnational flows that threaten national
security and identity. By transcending boundaries, global citizenship seeks to be the ultimate
fulfillment of our wish for belonging, protection, and for a god/parental figure. But as
aforementioned, conceptualizing of global citizenship is a challenge because of the paradox
between its wish for the absence of enclosure and the very need for boundaries in human group
identity. Or, it is precisely this paradox that devises the basis for belongingness in global
citizenship. Designed to overcome the limitations imposed by boundaries, the wish to transcend
boundaries is the common factor across, and the binding force of, the global citizenship
discourse. The possibility of its realization is difficult to foresee, but its logic in approaching the
problem with boundaries is creative in its expression of our want for universal belonging and
love.
With the intention to further the current discourse, this thesis offers a theological
examination of global citizenship, arguing that global citizenship is yet another translated
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identity reflecting human beings’ inherent wish for belonging to, protection from, and unity
under a “god” within new conceptual boundaries, based on the shared wish for the absence of the
enclosure, different from the territorial enclosure in the Westphalian system. Hence, contrary to
the claimed innate universality of global citizenship, there are boundaries nonetheless
constructing the differentiation between us and them within the concept of global citizenship—
just as medieval Christian politics and the modern state system have done.
To draw such conclusion, I take rather an unconventional approach in defining global
citizenship as an identity based on the wish for the absence of the enclosure through Sigmund
Freud’s theory on group formation and Wendy Brown’s analysis of his theory. I choose Freud
for a few specific reasons. First of all, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud
explains group and identity formation through the mutual identification of each member’s love
for a shared object. The fact that he grasps the importance of commonness in group formation
indicates the general applicability and agreeableness of his theory. Secondly, the connections
between his theories on religion in The Future of an Illusion and on groups in Group Psychology
can effectively demonstrate the relationship between our persistent, vulnerable need for a sense
of belonging, theology/religion, and global citizenship. Because Freud’s ideas on religion and
group are complementary, a more interesting and in-depth discussion is possible.
In portraying global citizenship as another mode to satisfy human desire for a sense of
belonging and security, I provide highly generalized pictures of the three periods to depict how
every enclosure both creates its own god figure and, through the limitations set by its boundaries,
endangers the legitimacy of the god figure. The first part of my argument captures the divine
politics in medieval times when the Christian God was sovereign. As uniformity under God
within his divine boundaries could not be achieved and differences in religion were recognized
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as a source of discrimination, unrest, and disorder, the medieval theology was translated into the
modern state system. However, as the second part of my argument shows, the modern
secularization of theology was only a deferral of the unresolved problem of difference. As a
result, the state experiences the limited capability of territorial boundaries. The last part of my
thesis explores human beings’ perpetual need for a god figure through Sigmund Freud’s analysis
of social grouping while suggesting that global citizenship involves creation of another god to
fulfill our craving for an unbounded sense of belonging. I end my thesis with a brief summary
and political implications of the theological approach to understanding global citizenship, along
with a final thought on humanity’s wish to belong.

5

Section I. Enclosing God Within Boundaries
i. The Divine Politics
It has been only a few centuries since the human world became separated from the divine
world.1 Unlike modern secularism (obliging strict detachment from religion at least in theory),
medieval Europe yearned for a unity between the two. Medieval churches designed in the
popular gothic style depict the wish to be closer to God. With their tall, narrow pointed towers
reaching towards Heaven, the massive and glamorously ornamented medieval churches stand as
if endowed with divinity on earth. As found in art, literature, morals, politics, and daily life—
though the effective political power of Christian institutions may be contested—the indisputable,
immense presence of Christianity characterizes medieval Europe. “Heaven was never too far
from earth,” Carlos Eire writes: “The sacred was diffused in the profane, the spiritual in the
material. Divine power, embodied in the Church and its sacraments, reached down through
innumerable points of contact to make itself felt: to forgive or to punish, to protect against the
ravages of nature, to heal, to soothe, and to work all sorts of wonders.”2 As the father and ruler of
all human beings, God governed earthly life by showing the right directions, urging people to
follow his words, and guiding people through the troubles of life. Those living up to his words
were to be rewarded with the celestial reunion with him in heaven, while those violating God’s
words were to be damned and punished. Divine authority in the celestial sphere, too far away to
see or reach even with the towers sharply projecting toward the sky, symbolized the absolute and
final power governing all sectors of human life.

1

Although the connection between God and politics has been present since ancient times, I begin the
discussion in medieval times for the purpose of the paper.
2

Eires, 1986: 1; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24

6

Because God was the ultimate ruler, political rulers had to justiry their authority and
power by somehow relating themselves to God, including declaring themselves as divinely
appointed. The monarch took the title Rex Dei Gratia (king by the grace of God), emphasizing
his “position as the vice-regent… of God” in the community.3 Thus, the monarch embodied both
celestial and terrestrial being; while he was physical and mortal as a human being, he was also
sacred and immortal as a representative of God.4 Yet, not all communities simply accepted their
kings’ claim as Rex Dei Gratia; in some cases kings or emperors needed the Pope’s confirmation
of their consecration in order to affirm the validity of their rule. For this reason, some kings
could not and did not dispute papal assertions, which strengthened the centralization of papal
power in their transferring of the final authority by accepting “that the canon law was valid
without royal consent; that the Pope could annul secular laws; that the Pope could depose
monarchs, transfer kingdoms, forbid conquests, allocate new lands, invalidate treaties; that it was
the king’s duty to extirpate papally-defined heresies.”5
In this way, Christianity and politics became intertwined, and the Church gradually
sought to centralize and strengthen its political power by restricting the number of recipients of
its divine power to itself. In the eleventh century, the Church no longer tolerated equating the
consecration of rulers with priesthood, distinguishing the Church’s power from these rulers.
Furthermore, the Church excluded “royal consecration from the sacraments of the Church” in the
following century.6 Being more fully in charge of the divine authority and its distribution, the
Church began exercising a more powerful status, as “a king could not repudiate the theocratic
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Hinsley, 1986: 63

4

Hinsley, 1986: 64-65

5

Hinsley, 1986: 64

6

Hinsley, 1986: 65

7

pretensions of these authorities without undermining the argument, on which he increasingly
relied, that he himself was a divinely appointed ruler in his own community.”7
Nonetheless, the extent of actual influence of the Church was restrained because, as F. H.
Hinsley points out, “even in the full theocratic theory Pope and Emperor could not issue orders
but could only exhort and advise.”8 Somewhat paradoxically, divine law was not recognized as
the unifying force of Europe until later when the Church ceased to support the monarchs,
suppressing communities resisting monarchal power and allied itself with resistant secular
communities. These communities sought to protect their right against the monarch’s further
empowerment by defending their secular right under the protective umbrella of canon law. The
desecularization of positive law in these communities helped prevent monarchical centralization,
and accordingly, it also further centralized the papal rule.9 It also meant desecularizing both the
monarchs and the communities while interweaving all laws and rules under divine law, as
Hinsley describes:
The conjunction of segmentary conditions within the kingdoms with the powerful spread
of Christianity and with all the other circumstances which underlay the existence of
authorities claiming universal authority within Christendom—a conjunction which
produced the theocratic aspirations of the kings themselves—led in every society to a
profound desecularization of thought. A process set in by which the law of the
community was conflated with God’s law. The law which the ruler, as the elect of the
community, bound himself to protect was initially a purely customary law of the kind
which is characteristic of the early stages in the development of societies—the good old
law which was a compound of ethics, religion, and acquitted private rights. This now
became more confused, though never wholly equated, with divine law.10

7

Hinsley, 1986: 65

8

Hinsley, 1986: 65

9

Hinsley, 1986: 66; Sergio Valverde (written comments to author, April 22, 2012) notes, “Actually, the
Western Church had an ambivalent attitude towards politics from the beginning. While it acquired more territory, it
never claimed to be a political unity, deferring to the Germanic kings on temporal power. The Eastern Church
definititely concentrated political and divine power in one figure: the Tsar or Byzantine Caesar (caesaro-papism).”
The point is well taken, since I make not distinction between the Roman Church and the Eastern European Church.
10

Hinsley, 1986: 67
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As a consequence—at least hypothetically until the thirteenth century—the ruler of heaven was
now the absolute lawgiver of the earth as well.11
The unity of medieval Europe under a Christian God, called respublica Christiana
(Christian republic) and populus Christianus (Christian people), had “definite orders and
orientations” within its jurisdiction.12 Non-Christians and their territory were considered as
objects of conquest and missionary work, and no intricate reasoning was necessary for conflicts
with and wars against outsiders. The question of just and unjust wars mattered only in regard to
Christian rulers. Wars among them were “bracketed wars,” still under the unity of the republica
Christiana, and they did not negate the unity.13 Rather, they were “feuds in the sense of
assertions of right, realization of right, or confirmations of a right of resistance, and they
occurred within the framework of one and the same total order encompassing both warring
parties.”14 The internal unity of Christian Europe was structured to contain its internal divisions
within its system and lines. It was one under one God.
However, such unity under Christian uniformity was only possible in theory.15 The
existence of diversity within and outside the unity could not be neglected. Not everyone
11

Hinsley, 1986: 68; He writes, “In theory, all law, in the separate communities as in Christendom, was
subsumed in the law of God and given a sanctity which placed it above all earthly authority.”
12

Schmitt, 2003: 58; It is interesting to note here that the medieval Christian unity was called respublica
since this reflects the doctrine of popular sovereignty, as Nicholas G. Onuf (1991: 36-37) writes:
That the people provide the ultimate rationale for any political arrangement is embedded in the very idea of
a res publica. In Latin, publicus is an adjective for anything belonging to the people corporately; res
publica refers abstractly to whatever belongs to the people. In the first instance, this must be their corporate
identity and, by extension, political arrangements for the common good. Thus, as the Oxford Latin
Dictionary reports, res publica is virtually synonymous with “body politic.”
13

Schmitt, 2003: 58

14

Schmitt, 2003: 58-59

15

That there was never a unity can be observed from the three antecedents Nicholas G. Onuf (1991: 43336) identifies for the concept sovereignty. The first of these antecedents is majestas, meaning “majesty.” Closely
related to republicanism, it refers to “the awe-inspiring formality and dignity of some political arrangement, or
person in a corporate sense. Majesty is not to be confused with ‘charisma’… [which] refers to awe-inspiring
qualities some individual must display to become or remain ruler… In principle, majesty is not just divisible, it is
divided—but only among corporate persons… Corporate persons each must perfect the form of organization most

9

submitted to divine law and frustration with the involuntarily imposed ideology of Christian
Europe grew. As early as the thirteenth century, the secular movement against the Church began
to expand. Increasing numbers of independent, quasi-independent, or national political units
were formed in Italy, England, Spain, and France. They denied medieval Christian jurisdiction,
whose order began to disintegrate as a consequence.16
The built-up tension and frustration from the oppressive unity was partially let out in the
New World, which lay outside the legal jurisdiction of Christian Europe. The New World was
“beyond the line” and an open space for freedom, meaning it was “an area where force could be
used freely and ruthlessly.”17 The activities and events beyond the line “remained outside the
legal, moral and political values recognized on this side of the line,” and thus, they provided a
space for “a tremendous exoneration of the internal European problematic.”18 This ungoverned
space indicated a contradiction to the claimed unity under one God. The freedom beyond the line
utilized by Christian rulers and the recurring confrontation between Christian Europe and nonChristian, outsiders, barbarians, etc. directly refuted the Pope’s assertion to universal dominion
and contradicted the divine unity.19

suited to their own level, which suggests that majesty would have a distinctive character at each level in the series.
Although the majesty of the highest level would surely exceed that of lower levels, perhaps to a great and impressive
degree, it nonetheless cannot be said to be final or absolute, thereby excluding the possibility of majesty, however
modest, at other levels.” The second antecedent is imperium, which is typically translated as “supreme
administrative power,” “rule,” and “dominion.” Its other meaning is empire, more specifically, the Roman Empire.
Onuf explains that since the Roman Empire grew out of the republic, it still possessed some republican
characteristics, “including the idea that rule was a constitutional matter, however great the powers of the emperor or
capricious his conduct.” Thus, imperium “is rule by rules, not domination by brute force.” The third and last of
sovereignty’s conceptual antecedents comes from the claim that people were superior to their leaders in the
medieval church: “the populus is major, superior, potior, dominus.” Onuf writes, “Leaders then are ministers to the
people. The doctrine of ‘popular sovereignty’ as it is now known, had nothing to say of majestas… Imperium is but
a conditional grant of authority, and majestas no longer an incident of office.”
16

Gross, 1948: 30; Schmitt, 2003: 65

17

Schmitt, 2003: 94

18

Schmitt, 2003: 94

19

Gross, 1948: 30
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The frustration with the impractical and unrealistic Christian claim to unity soon turned
its direction of exoneration inward, toward Europe itself, especially as the need to rectify
corruption in the Church became apparent. As a response to the Church’s inability to provide
sufficient justification for its unseen God and his power, there was a recognized demand to
reinterpret and reconceptualize the meaning of Christian unity and what the role of the Church
ought to be. So the Reformation movement led the way in the sixteenth century, and as a result,
as Gross describes, “the Great Schism in the Church (1378-1417) and the rise of sects and
eventually of the Reformation weakened correspondingly the authority of the Pope.”20
Protestants criticized “the ideological monopoly and material power of the Catholic Church” and
accused the church of idolatry, of “substituting its own decree for those of God,” and “directing
the worshiper’s attention not to God, but to material artifacts.”21 The reformers demonstrated
their condemnation for the Catholic Church: “churches were sacked, images smashed and burned,
relics overturned, and consecrated hosts fed to dogs and goats.”22 The determination to create a
new vision of God and the Church proliferated through the whole of Europe, from Germany and
Switzerland to France, the Netherlands, and England, which denotes that “the unity of the
European religious vision was forever shattered.”23
Not surprisingly, the Catholic Church was not inclined to give up its power and no one
accepted any room for compromise to reshape Christianity into a more tolerant structure. The
Catholic Church strived to suppress the Reformation and insisted on a return to orthodoxy as
manifested in, for example, the Edict of Worms (1521), the Second Diet of Speyer (1529), and
20

Gross, 1948: 30

21

Eire, 1986: 55-56; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 26;
Protestants here specifically mean Calvinists.
22

Eire, 1986: 2; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24

23

Eire, 1986: 2; see also Head, 1998: 95-96; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 24-25
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the Diet of Augsburg (1530).24 Since neither the Church nor Protestants had any intention to take
a step back and authorize the splitting of Christianity, the confrontation only escalated into an
extensive period of hostility and violence: “In the end, princes loyal to Catholicism leapt to or
were drawn into a defense of the Universal Church—a Counter Reformation led by the
Habsburgs, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the papacy. German Protestants responded in kind,
and both sides mobilized for war.”25 Yet, there were also moments when the conflict was
brought to a temporary and limited halt. The Peace of Augsburg officially ended the struggle
between Catholic and Lutheran princes in 1555, but, it was “an initial and relatively meager
attempt to come to terms with the problem of difference.”26 Nonetheless, as Inayatullah and
Blaney emphasize, the Peace of Augsburg was only a temporary remedy because those who
signed it “had not yet given up the hope of re-establishing some sort of religious unity” and
because it excluded Calvinists, Zwinglians, Anabaptists, and other sects.27
The unresolved contention among the different visions of uniform Christianity reached a
climax during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) of the seventeenth century, one of the most
traumatizing periods in European history. Inayatullah and Blaney note that the war “is infamous
for the material devastation, but also for the social, moral, and psychic scars it left across
Europe.”28 Trevor-Roper writes in a similar manner that it was the “greatest and most destructive
war in preindustrial Europe.”29 Geoffrey Parker describes the Thirty Years’ War as follows: “the
loss of people was proportionally greater than in World War II; the displacement of the people

24

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

25

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

26

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

27

Asch, 1997: 10; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 27

28

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29

29

Trevor-Roper, 1962: 33; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29
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and the material devastation was almost as great; the cultural and economic dislocation persisted
for substantially longer.”30 Following Charles Weeks, Inayatullah and Blaney depict the
destructiveness of the war more vividly: “the Thirty Years’ War was a total ideological war,
ushering in a ‘modernist’ period in which the ‘unfolding disasters of war’—runaway inflation,
spiraling military engagement, and a ‘phalanx of disease, hunger, and chaos’—crashed down on
civilian populations.”31
In addition to spreading diseases and epidemics and the occurrence of torture and rape of
even children and pregnant women, it was “the frenzy of killing” that dominated Europe.32
Toulmin describes how the hostility and the gap between the Protestant Reformation and the
Counter-Reformation deepened with “the frenzy of killing”:
The longer the bloodshed continued, the more paradoxical the state of Europe became.
Whether for pay or from conviction, there were many who would kill and burn in the
name of theological doctrines that no one could give any conclusive reason for accepting.
The intellectual debate between Protestant Reformers and their Counter-Reformation
opponents had collapsed, and there was no alternative to the sword and the torch. Yet the
more brutal the warfare became, the more firmly convinced the proponents of each
religious system were that their doctrines must be proved correct, and that their opponents
were stupid, malicious, or both.33

Chaos enveloped Europe during the Thirty Years’ War. What actually lay behind the surface of
everyone’s certainty in his/her own belief was just a moral anarchy, confusion about what was
right and wrong, what was humane and inhumane, and what Europe was and what it ought to be.
There seemed to be neither movement toward nor hope for reconciliation among the different
opinions on what God and Christianity ought to be, and only a deepening hatred remained in
Europe.

30

Parker, 1997: 192-193; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 20

31

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29; they are using quotes from Weeks (1991: 213)

32

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 29-30

33

Toulmin, 1990: 54; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 30
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ii. The Peace of Westphalia: Secular Translation of Theology
The Thirty Years’ War, which has its origin in religious conflicts and intolerance, left
Europe in devastation and revealed the dire need to construct a mechanism to prevent religious
conflicts.34 Accordingly, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was designed to consecrate a more
tolerant model of Europe by, as Leo Gross writes, endorsing “the principle of toleration by
establishing the equality between Protestant and Catholic states and by providing some
safeguards for religious minorities.”35 The Treaty of Osnabrück laid out the basic rules protecting
religious minorities:
Subjects who in 1627 had been debarred from the free exercise of their religion, other
than that of their ruler, were by the Peace [of Westphalia] granted the right of conducting
private worship, and of educating their children, at home or abroad, in conformity with
their own faith; they were not to suffer in any civil capacity nor to be denied religious
burial, but were to be at liberty to migrate, selling their estates or leaving them to be
managed by others.36

The Treaty of Osnabrück also provided the ground for assuring equality between Catholics and
Protestants by granting the equal consulting and voting power while the Treaty of Münster
specified sanctions for violations.37 Founding a model for modern international law “by
divorcing it from any particular religious background, and the extension of its scope so as to
include, on a footing of equality,” the Peace of Westphalia announced a more tolerant
community in Europe where people stood before judges regardless of their religions.38
The “secularization” of politics brought in the need for a new political institution called
the state, designed to contain and relieve religious conflict and violence within their boundaries
in order to foster religious tolerance. Accordingly, the Peace of Westphalia is normally granted
34
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as the historical event in international relations that marks “the end of an epoch and the opening
of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world. The old
world, we are told, lived in the idea of a Christian commonwealth, of a world harmoniously
ordered and governed in the spiritual and temporal realms by the Pope and Emperor.”39 It marks
the movement from the medieval world to the modern world, “from the idea of Europe as unified
by Christianity to a European system of independent states, and from a web of overlapping and
competing authorities to a modern system based on the demarcation of exclusive territorial
jurisdictions.”40
In other words, distributing and containing the old God and his power to govern within
borders, the states in the Westphalian system had become new gods, sovereign entities. No
higher authority could stand above the state, which governs all sectors of life—economy, social
norms, crimes, and political and religious disputes—within its jurisdiction. As a consequence,
the state came to represent much of the current political system and it has “become virtually
interchangeable” with the term political society; it is still just “the name we attach to one among
the various political institutions which societies develop” for it embodies “a structure of
command imposed upon the community in which it rules or attempts to rule.”41 In our societies
today, the state system strikes us as a “natural” or inherent structure in international politics.
Considered as the sovereign entity that is responsible for and in charge of all matters within its
enclosure, the state is our new “Father.” The Westphalian system symbolizes the secular
translation of theology into politics.
A new modern state required a new justification for its for its existence and its exercise of
39
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political power. If it were God’s divinity, his absolute and final authority, that granted political
sovereignty and defined political structure, the Westphalian model required a corresponding
secular substitute.42 The divine power was hence converted into what is now called sovereignty,
corroborating the idea “that final authority should rest within each independent community, that
each community is in this sense self-determining.”43 Instead of being subject to the rule under the
hegemonizing and homogenizing divine unity, each political community should supposedly “be
governed by rules, norms, goals, and purposes that belong to it in some strong sense, that express
the ‘values and visions’ implicit in the community’s conception of the good life.”44 This means
that it is only through the assumption of sovereignty that, a political entity can establish itself as
a modern secular state; Hinsley notes the inseparable relationship between state and sovereignty,
that “when a society is ruled by means of the state the concept of sovereignty is sooner or later
unavoidable… the rise of state forms is a necessary condition of the notion of sovereignty.”45
Accordingly, he writes, “The concept of sovereignty will not be found in societies in which there
is no state.”46 God and his divine power were always, in theory, at work together in the medieval
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politics. Correspondingly, state and sovereignty also require each other for their own existence as
valid concepts.
The concepts of state and sovereignty always go hand in hand. Indeed, it is their shared
historical background that permits sovereignty as the adequate and necessary method of
legitimizing the state as the modern political authority.47 Sovereignty has its foundation in the
past methods of political legitimization, as seen in Hinsley’s description:
Sovereignty is a concept by which men have sought to buttress older forms of
legitimation and accountability or on which they have hoped to base new versions of
these means by which power is converted into authority. Its function in the history of
politics has been either to strengthen the claims of power or to strengthen the ways by
which political power may be called to account… However delayed in the history of any
society that stage may have been, sovereignty at its first inception has still been only a
new solution of an existing problem, a new way of thinking about power and rule; and
however novel this solution may have been when first formulated, it has still been only a
development out of earlier solutions of that problem.48

In sum, the concept sovereignty emerged from the continuous problem of how to legitimize
47

It should be pointed out that Hinsley (1986: 7, 17-18, 21) does not contend that the process of pairing
sovereignty and state was simultaneous:
The stateless society—this is the most obvious difference [in comparison to the state]—has no single
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of the forms of the state has not usually been followed at once, if followed at all, by the discussion of
political power in sovereignty terms. Nor it is possible to explain this delay by supposing that there has
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of the state’s claims; for sovereignty has not been the first concept to emerge even when men have
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sufficient condition of it.
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segmentary in many respects even after the forms of the state have been appeared, and even after they have
been accepted, within it. Indeed this phase in the development of the relations between a community and its
state has been experienced so widely as to justify the use of the term ‘segmentary state’ to connote the
intermediate political system in which the administrative forms of the central state and the segmentary
organization of power in the society are found in combination.
It is when a sufficient element in the community in which the state operates has sufficiently come
to accept it and when, in the process of becoming accepted it and when, in the process of becoming
accepted to this sufficient extent, the state has adjusted its forms and its outlook to the demands and
conditions of the community—it is then and only then, at the point when the state is ceasing to be a
segmentary state, that the concept of sovereignty has been newly coined.
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power and rule in an evermore efficient and persuasive way. More specifically, it springs from
the movement toward modernity against the Christian unity, as Inayatullah and Blaney argue,
drawing on Leo Gross’s words: “The principle of sovereignty is understood as the culmination of
resistance to the hierarchical social order of Christendom, the idea that outside forces (God, pope,
emperor) determine the life of each ‘community,’ weaving them into a single ‘Christian
Commonwealth.’”49 The historical reflection and background of sovereignty show how it was
interactively generated in accordance with the given social and political context in early
modernity. In this way, sovereignty provides the state with the implements to legitimize its
governance and converts its power into authority.
Accordingly, it should not be surprising that modern state sovereignty resembles
medieval divinity. The definition of sovereignty is commonly considered to denote “the idea that
there is a final and absolute political authority in the community,” which does not seem to differ
from the central qualities of medieval divine authority.50 Both of them provide the means to
justify political authority, indicating that the functions of divinity and sovereignty remain the
same. In same way, medieval divinity grounded papal power and rule, sovereignty grants the
state final and absolute authority to decide, regulate, and preside over society. However, political
sovereignty’s relation to theology is not just simple imitation or appropriation. It is rather that, to
borrow Wendy Brown’s words, “God is the original sovereign.”51 Brown further writes:
Political sovereignty may be a secularized theological concept, but secularization, we
need remember, does not mean the end of religion… This means that sovereignty
secularized for political purposes does not lose its religious structure or bearing, even as
it ceases to have the direct authority of God at its heart… [Sovereignty] of a supreme,
infinite, and supervenient power, is born of the human experience of smallness and
vulnerability in a huge and overwhelming universe and that it harbors a desire for
49
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protection, containment, and orientation in the face of this experience… [and] provides
horizons and compass points for knowing and belonging.”52

In Brown’s description of sovereignty, it is perfectly applicable to replace the word sovereignty
with God: “As a power, it is supreme, unified, unaccountable, and generative. It is the source,
condition, and protector of civic life and a unique form of power insofar as it brings a new entity
into being and sustains control over its creation. It punishes and protects. It is the source of law
and above the law.”53 Thus, state and sovereignty did not simply spring from theological
historical background; rather, they are theological.
Carl Schmitt also draws the connection between state sovereignty and theology, focusing
on the absoluteness of both. In Political Theology, he writes that he is not content with the
traditional definition of sovereignty that, only slightly different from Hinsley’s definition, it is
“the highest, legally independent, underived power.”54 He reasons that there cannot exist such
power in fact: “in political reality there is no irresistible highest or greatest power that operates
according to the certainty of natural law.”55 Since law is already a product of the state, it would
be arbitrary if the state were to violate its own principle. In other words, the state may not
override its constitution in judging cases acknowledged by and existing in the general norm
because the norm is already “represented by an ordinary legal prescription.”56 Instead of the
generic definition, Schmitt offers a more specified “systematic, legal-logical” definition of
sovereignty in his utmost famous expression: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”57
By exception, Schmitt means a situation that is not already represented in the existing
52
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constitution or norm. The norm has its limitations because it “can never encompass a total
exception,” but this does not convey that an exception means anarchy or chaos.58 Rather, an
exception is “the suspension of the entire existing [legal] order”—but not of the state.59 There
must be a normal situation in order for a legal order to exist, and it is only an exception when the
situation exceeds the normal legal capacity to judge.60 In the normal situation, legal precedent
provides juridical guidance, meaning that autonomous decision making recedes to a minimum. In
the case of the exception, by contrast, the norm is destroyed and law recedes, though the state
remains.61
If the state and sovereignty are the modern translations of God and divinity, Schmitt
writes that the exception embodies the miracle in theology, both of which are characterized by
unlimited authority.62 The sovereign is not simply someone who rules, but someone who holds a
monopoly on the decision power over the exception:
All law is “situational law.” The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its
totality. He has the monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the
state’s sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to
coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most clearly the
essence of the state’s authority.63

As the story goes, God proved himself by performing miracles. For the state, it is the decision
power on the exception that proves everything: its rule, power, and existence. Thus for Schmitt,
“The exception is more interesting than the rule. The rule proves nothing; the exception proves
everything: It confirms not only the rule but also its existence, which derives only from the
58
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exception.”64 Even though the modern state may be a constructed being as Hinsley contends, it
can prove itself as a sovereign being who practices its jurisdiction over people and territory.
Therefore, the principal qualities of the state and its sovereignty embody a translation of God,
“the original sovereign.”65
iii. The Need for the Enclosure: “Proving” Theology
When Schmitt writes that “the exception proves everything”—“not only the rule but also
its existence”—it is not the exception that legitimizes the sovereign’s existence in the first
place.66 Though sovereignty is what legitimizes the state’s exercise of jurisdictional power, it
does not have the power to establish the state’s existence. Both divinity and sovereignty are
employed to “prove” the authority and the existence of the Church and the State, but they are by
no means internally absolute concepts that are self-legitimizng and self-justifying. As Wendy
Brown notes, sovereignty has “no internal essence” although it “stands for autonomy, selfpresence, and self-sufficiency.”67 As I have already pointed out, with reference to Hinsley, it is a
concept that is constructed in the course of history like other political concepts and institutions.
Rather, sovereignty appears “real” precisely because there are other equally sovereign
beings. For Schmitt, a political entity’s existence is relational. It is completely dependent on the
existence of other equal and parallel political entities, meaning that there always must be more
than one entity in order to be political. The validity of a sovereign entity is almost automatically
64
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proven by the fact that there are also other entities exercising their sovereign power. In other
words, it is the other, who is similar but different, is required to prove one’s existence as a
sovereign. As already well known in the political science discourse, sovereignty, identity, and
entity are relative concepts.68 Each requires a differentiation between the internal us from the
external them in order to clarify who lies outside the jurisdiction of the respective entity. The
need for the presence of the other also applies to generating a sense of belonging. We can only
circumscribe ourselves as us because we are not them, and the state’s existence becomes real
because its exercise of power has effect on us, as opposed to the exercise of power by other state
on them.
Schmitt stresses the existence of the other, or the external enemy in his terminology, as
the foundational quality of political existence and identity. According to him, the essence of the
political is derived from the distinction between friend and enemy: “The specific political to
which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”69 Schmitt
contends that the distinction of friend and enemy indicates “the utmost degree of intensity of a
union or separation, of an association or dissociation.”70 Political life then revolves around the
friend-enemy grouping, “deciding who the enemy is and what to do about the enmity.”71 Those
threatening the assumed uniformity of the internal us constitute the possible enemy, subject to at
best toleration and at worst violence. The enemy is not simply a competitor, an opponent in
conflict, or an object of hatred. It does not denote someone on a private level; rather, the enemy
is always a collective public entity in a hostile relation. As Schmitt states, “An enemy exists only
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when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.”72
The word “fighting” here is the most crucial component of the enemy because, Schmitt
argues, it is “the ever present possibility of combat” that elucidates the concept.73 More
specifically, it entails “the real possibility of physical killing,” in which case, as Schmitt
continues, “the friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning.”74 In this manner,
the political entity involves “the most intense and extreme antagonism”; the more antagonistic a
social entity is, the more political it is, and the friend-enemy relation also becomes more
distinct.75 Thus, what matters in the concept of the political is the possibility of physical
expression of hostility; Schmitt takes this further when he writes that “what always matters is
only the possibility of conflict.”76 He concludes that the “real” friend-enemy grouping is
“existentially so strong and decisive that the nonpolitical antithesis, at precisely the moment at
which it becomes political, pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious, purely
economic, purely cultural criteria and motives to the conditions and conclusions of the political
situation at hand.”77
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Because the state is that which makes decisions differentiating friend and enemy, Schmitt
regards the state as “an essentially political entity” that is always decisive and sovereign.78 The
state is decisive in the sense that there is no midway in its existence—“it exists or it does not
exist”—and when it exists, it is the supreme, authoritative entity within itself.79 Thus, in its
“decisionism,” the political entity is sovereign; as Schmitt writes, “In the orientation toward the
possible extreme case of an actual battle against a real enemy, the political entity is essential, and
it is the decisive entity for the friend-or-enemy grouping; and in this (and not in any kind of
absolutist sense), it is sovereign. Otherwise the political entity is nonexistent.”80 The state draws
the boundaries to distinguish itself from others and categorizes others as friend or enemy, and in
doing so, it becomes the political sovereign.81 Furthermore, the friend-enemy grouping implies
extreme consequences. The state possesses the power to wage (or not wage) a war against the
enemy, which is “the existential negation” of them, and also the power to kill its own populace in
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order to ensure its existence.82 The state is the sovereign entity, making decisions regarding
critical situations including the exception and lives of people.83
Respublica Christiana does not significantly differ from the state as an essentially
political entity. Though Schmitt differentiates the political from the purely religious, Respublica
Christiana by no means sustained itself in the exclusively religious realm. While practicing the
decision power over the exception as reflected in different edicts declared, Christendom
articulated a clear distinction between friend and enemy: Christians versus non-Christians or the
Orthodox versus heresies. With God as the sovereign entity, those who deviated from “his words”
constituted the enemy of Christianity, and paid for their transgressions in violence and “physical
killing” in numerous religious wars. The Church had the power—or could call upon monarchs—
to wage wars against its enemies and dispose of human lives for the sake of its righteousness.
The intensity of its antagonism toward the other is well known: the Crusades during the 11th
through the 13th centuries as a response to Muslim conquests; the violence used against
indigenous populations of various parts of the world; and, of course, the internal wars among
different Christian sects including the Thirty Years’ War. Until the 17th century when conflict
within Europe became pervasive, the Church claimed the decision power to allocate resources
for wars against its enemies, proving its majesty to its others as a political entity.
Yet, Respublica Christiana and the state are different political entities in that they draw
the boundaries distinguishing themselves from others, insider from outsider, or who belongs to
them from who does not, on different bases. Medieval Christian Europe used theological
boundaries based on the faith of those believing in God. Within this Christian boundary, there
82
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was unity under one God, the absolute and final authority who governed the human world
through his earthly representatives. As mentioned earlier, internal conflicts were considered as
“bracketed” within the enclosure and did not disrupt the unity.84 Outside the divine boundaries
lay non-Christians, who could not benefit from God’s protection and governance and were
subject to conquest and Christian conversion. Any entities opposed to God were considered the
enemy, and could be accountable with hatred, physical punishment, and even war.
However, the problem with the theological boundaries was that faith was too intangible
and ambiguous to be a concise and effective dividing line. The endless conflicts among different
sects of Christianity—such as Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Zwinglians, and Anabaptists—
were intended to correct this ambiguity in the “right” way. God’s “true” intentions were as
abstract as his essence. Hence, there could not be a succinct or final demarcation for where God
would have drawn the boundaries between the “true” Christian practice and heresies. As a result,
there was bloodshed regarding what this theological boundary exactly should mean, what kind of
faith God wanted, and whose God was the right one. In the end, ambiguities destabilized the idea
of Christian Europe.
This led to the rise of the Westphalian system, which demanded a more secular and more
tangible version of boundaries. Instead of impalpable, contentious, and invisible theological
boundaries, the Westphalian system has visualized boundaries—it drew them onto a map—and
as a result, territorial borders define each state’s being.85 Bold and clear straight lines re-
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distributed, transferred, and mapped medieval divinity onto states. Territorial boundaries have
drawn a finite and distinct space for each state, whose sovereignty is pertinent solely to the
territory enclosed by its boundaries. These boundaries determine the distinction between internal
and external and ascribe different identities of us and them. What is beyond boundaries is beyond
our jurisdiction; it belongs to their jurisdiction. The exclusivity of sovereignty, as Inayatullah
and Blaney suggest, “take[s] on a distinctly spatial or territorial character in that the territory of
ruler/political community is subject to his/its exclusive jurisdiction.”86 Thus, territorial
boundaries represent jurisdictional boundaries, and the territorial enclosure “grants each state a
protective shell for the exercise of sovereignty.”87 Territoriality constructs the foundation for an
internal rule, jurisdiction, and sovereignty, while leaving the external in an anarchy full of other
equal states without a sovereign entity governing all of them.88 The space in between internal
jurisdictions is lawless, vulnerable to harm, without any guidance, and uncivilized. It is only
within the internal space of territorial enclosure where a political structure can be found, as
shown in Schmitt’s quote of an old maxim: “[a]ll law is law only in a particular location.”89
Within their respective territorial enclosure, states behave as the sole sovereign unity—like

86

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 188; see also Kratochwil, 1995: 26, 269; Onuf (1998:131) adds, “If states
are sovereign, then they have rights of possession and use with respect to their own territory but not the territory of
others, except of course by agreement. Sovereign states function like rights-bearing individuals in liberal
circumstances.”
87

Onuf, 1998:131; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 188

88

Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 188) explain the “act of reciprocal recognition,” that “on the one hand,
sovereignty constitutes states as existentially separate in that, by promoting their own sovereignty, they constitute
themselves as discrete entities. On the other hand, by accepting the status of sovereign, states simultaneously
constitute others as outside, alien, and competitors, but, nevertheless … as sovereign others.” Such “an act of
reciprocal recognition is necessary to create the condition in which states treat each other as discrete, disparate, and
self-helping entities.” Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 147) also write, “In international society each political
community is recognized as a sovereign equal, possessing the same rights and duties. This equality of status implies
a duty of each political community to respect the sovereign of others (Hinsley, 1986: 258; Wight, 1977: 135), to
allow different versions of the good life to be played out—mostly free from unwanted interference—behind the
protection of sovereign boundaries.”
89

Schmitt, 2003: 98

27

God.90 The modern state exercises final and exclusive jurisdiction over its land, which implies
that the essence of political power originates from and resides within the territorial enclosure.
Territoriality is the imperative element in the modern state system.
Schmitt emphasizes territoriality as the basis for political order and law. The inseparable
relationship between territoriality and sovereignty owes its ties to land since “the model for
imagining sovereignty was generally landed property.”91 In The Nomos of the Earth, he
extensively argues that law has been always terrestrially oriented and land appropriation always
“takes first place.”92 He begins his book with an account of how “law is bound to the earth and
related to the earth” in a threefold way.93 First, there is law within the earth itself because of the
simple labor-reward relationship between farming and harvesting. Secondly, the earth “manifests
law upon herself, as fixed boundaries.”94 As human beings work on her land, lines and divisions
become apparent, and accordingly, “the standards and rules of human cultivation of the earth
become discernible.”95 Lastly, the lines and divisions become even firmer: “the solid ground of
the earth is delineated by fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, houses, and other constructs.”96
The earth thus bears law above itself—“as a public sign of order”—as it is “delineated” by
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Tully (1995: 64-67; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 43) explains the national unity based on
uniformity within the state: “The sovereign people, in modern societies, … establish a constitution that is legally and
politically uniform: a constitution of equal citizens who are treated identically rather than equitably, of one national
system of institutionalised legal and political authority rather than many, and a constitutional nation equal in status
to all others.”
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Hann, 1998: 5; Brewer and Staves, 1995: 2; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 188; Inayatullah and
Blaney also draw from other political theorists. They write that “Charles Beitz (1991: 243) refers to ‘a state’s
domestic jurisdiction’ as a kind of ‘collective property right for the citizens of that state,’ with all the powers of
exclusion that follow, and Barry Buzan (1991: 93) speaks of the territory of the state, including its population and
resources, as ‘national property.’”
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various walls and enclosures.97 Orders and orientations are born within each distinct enclosure,
and “forms of power and domination” are also distinct within the enclosure. In other words, if
God first created Mother Earth and then other beings upon her, the Earth subsequently provided
us with the basis for what we needed as human and political beings. When her vast land was
divided, appropriated, and enclosed, the Earth gave birth to politics.
Schmitt’s emphasis on land appropriation as a requirement for law is well articulated
when he explains the etymology of the word nomos. As Brown points out, Schmitt’s etymology
of nomos may be contested, but his appreciation for “enclosure as a prerequisite of political order
and law” cannot be overlooked.98 Although nomos is generally translated as “law,” “regulation,”
or “norm” today, its original meaning “was fundamentally a spatial term,” associated with land
appropriation.99 Its root comes from the Greek word nemein, which means both “to divide” and
“to pasture.” Thus, nomos “is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a
people becomes a spatially visible… [It] is the measure by which the land in a particular order is
divided and situated; it is also the form of political, social, and religious order determined by this
process. Hence, measure, order, and form constitute a spatially concrete unity”100 Thus, the
“original act is nomos.”101 Land appropriation takes precedent in every case as the foundation of
all law: “land appropriation, both internally and externally, is the primary legal title that
underlies all subsequent law,” such as territorial law and territorial succession, militia and the
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Brown, 2010: 45; The original text: “Schmitt’s etymology of nomos may be contested, and his emphasis
on land appropriation as the essential foundation of all order may be overstated, but his appreciation of enclosure as
a prerequisite of political order and law is difficult to set aside.”
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national guard, and also the distinction between private and public law.102
Schmitt is not alone in announcing territoriality as the prerequisite for political
sovereignty, jurisdiction, property ownership, institutions, public and private law.103 John Locke,
among others, explicitly emphasizes the importance of territoriality in political founding and
sovereignty.104 In the Second Treatise on Government, he explains how the social contract
emerges as a reflection of the need to assure protection of the right to own property, while
defining political power as “a right of making laws…for the regulating and preserving of
property.”105 Locke argues that when one consents to a government, one submits his/her land to
that government’s jurisdiction; he writes, “it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter
into society with others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land,
whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from the
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Schmitt, 2003: 46; see also Brown, 2010: 44
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For example, although I do not discuss them, Schmitt (2003: 47-48) identifies such theorists from Vico
to Kant, to which Brown (2010: 44) adds from Machiavelli to Rousseau.
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Brown, 2010: 44; Innayatullah and Blaney (2004: 41) also explain Locke’s Second Treatise, which
sound quite similar to Schmitt’s account other than that Locke focuses on property and ownership more than Schmitt
does:
Though the world is originally “given to Mankind in common,” the appropriation of property by
individuals is possible, even in a prepolitical “state of nature,” because the natural right to self-preservation
allows the acquisition and consumption of the produce of nature by individuals. The mechanism for this
appropriation of nature as property, Locke suggests, is the application of labor. Initially applying this logic
to hunting and gathering, Locke extends it to ownership of the land: “as much Land as a Man Tills, Plants,
Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his Property.” The requirement of cultivation
and improvement allows Locke to assert that the enclosure of land does no injury to other claimants, since
the application of human labor to land “does not lessen but increases the common stock of humankind.”
The progressive enclosure of land as private property eventually procdued settlements and cities that “came
in time to set out the bounds of their distinct Territories.” Though the appropriation of property is justified
by natural law and the territorial bounds of settlements might be negotiated by societies in the state of
nature, a definitive demarcation of property rights and territorial boundaries depends on the formation of
government(s)—the establishment by “Compact” of the institutions of rule definitive of a world civil
societies. We might say, then, that these two enclosures—of landed property and territorial boundaries—
operate in tandem: ownership and sovereignty equally establish exclusive rights of dominion, by which
property owner and political community can exclude others from the benefits flowing from or attaching to
objects of property and membership in community. Locke thus envisions a world of bounded territorial
states, each containing a civil society in which landed property is the distinctively civilized form of
entitlement and the industrious property owner is the epitome of a civilized citizen.
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jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject.”106
Thus, he “envisions a world of bounded territorial states” and for him, the essence of political
power “is jurisdiction over the land.”107
To recount, “there was first the enclosure and then the sovereign.”108 In the way God
began the human world, land appropriation is “based on sacred orientations” and always marks
the beginning.109 It is “found at the beginning of the history… [at] the beginning of every
historical epoch… land appropriation precedes the order that follows from it. It constitutes the
original spatial order, the source of all further concrete order and all further law. It is the
reproductive root in the normative order of history.”110 Jost Trier states the same: “In the
beginning was the fence. Fence, enclosure, and borders are deeply interwoven in the world
formed by men, determining its concepts. The enclosure gave birth to the shrine by removing it
from the ordinary, placing it under its own laws, and entrusting it to the divine.”111 The state
depends on its birth mother—namely, the enclosure—for everything. It has entrusted its
exclusive sovereignty, governance, identity, and unity to the enclosure in order to contain the
problem of difference.
In this respect, the Westphalian state system is just a container for the secular translation
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Locke, 1980: 64
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Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 41; Schmitt, 2003: 47; quoted in Brown, 2010: 44; These are Schmitt’s
words describing Locke. Schmitt (2003: 47) further points out that Locke “understands jurisdiction in medieval
terms, as sovereignty and dominion in general. For him, the occupation of a country is subjugation by whoever has
jurisdiction over the soil. Domination is, first of all, rule only over the land and, only as a consequence of this, rule
over the people who live on it.” Brown (2010: 44) also explains the importance of the enclosure for Locke: “Fences,
titles, and enclosures are among Locke’s most fecund and ubiquitous metaphors in the Second Treaties; they secure
freedom, representation, and limits to the right of rebellion, as well as actual territory.”
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I am borrowing words from Brown (2010: 45). She writes, “There is first the enclosure and then the
sovereign. Or, put the other way around, it is through the walling off of space from the common that sovereignty is
born.”
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of theology; its essence has not changed from that of divine politics. The state is still in charge of
the same duties to protect, provide a sense of belonging, and contain its people, and the
superiority of its sovereignty corresponds to divine power. The existence of state is like the
existence of God—it “is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm.
The decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense absolute.”112 As
Schmitt writes, “The juridic formulas of the omnipotence of the state are, in fact, only superficial
secularizations of theological formulas of the omnipotence of God.”113 In other words, “the
omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver” through historical development, and thus, the
modern political concepts are what were “transferred from theology to the theory of the state.”114
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Section II. The Westphalian Fiction
i. Translated Theology, Translated Problems
The Westphalian Deferral and Toleration
Though it is difficult to convey all nuances, a translated work is meant to be as close as
possible to the original work. Translating theological ideas into secular concepts carries along—
rather than solves—the prevailing problems. More often than ideally, a final resolution for a
highly disputable problem tends to rest on an intentional ignorance of the problem, as if looking
away from the problem is almost the same as eliminating the source of the conflict. The
Westphalian system follows a similar practice. The state system merely displaced the problem of
difference into the state enclosure and thus silenced it in the international realm, despite its goal
of ending religious conflicts as a source of an enormous political confrontation. Though the
tension among the difference displaced in the state—no matter how pervasive—does not
manifest as catastrophically as it did in the Thirty Years’ War, the Peace of Westphalia was not
an effective attempt to resolve the problem, but it merely deferred the problem. As Inayatullah
and Blaney indicate:
While this was no mean achievement, the problem was not so much resolved as it was
deferred—displaced into the domestic realm, where, it was hoped, it could be managed
and contained… [T]he attempt to contain difference within the relatively autonomous
units recognized by Westphalia deferred a deeper exploration and engagement of the
problem of difference.115
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Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 32-33; They write:
Ronald Asch (1997: 193-94) notes that Westphalia was not a solution to the problem of religious difference,
but, rather, it kept alive the religious conflicts of the previous century, confirming the existing status, rights,
and privileges of the confessional churches, and thereby “perpetuating religious divisions,” albeit in a more
“muted form.” Combined with a recognition of the independence of princes, the effect was to divide
“Europe’ into Catholic and Protestant spaces” and spur “the interstate construction of the continent”
(Campbell, 1992: 51). Religious tolerance among sovereigns was made, in effect, a function of the balance
of power among them (Keene, 1998: 21), but within the nascent states the situation was different. Despite
the treaties’ relative embrace of religious liberty, the moral constraints placed on rulers were, as Krasner
(1993: 244-45) observes, on a collision course with the sovereign’s right to dictate the faith of the realm as
originally acknowledged in the Treaty of Augsburg and as supported by the emerging reality and theory of
sovereignty. “[F]rom now on,” Toulmin (1990: 91) concludes, “established religion was the general rule.”
… [Furthermore] the consequences for religious liberty were not uniform across the newly sanctified
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Despite the Westphalian hope, the problem of difference could not be enclosed within a mapped
out space. Simply creating a new system with political power justified within a newly
constructed enclosure is only a temporary pain killer for the persisting problem of difference.
However, the Westphalian state system was not a simple deferral of the problem; contrary
to its generally received view as a movement toward toleration and diversity, it actually fostered
uniformity.116 As we have seen in the case of Respublica Christiana, uniformity is a prerequisite
for unity. If uniformity cannot be achieved—and it rarely can—unity breaks. For an order to be
established, there must be an enclosure with boundaries separating the internal from the external,
and for the order to be maintained, there should be uniformity within the enclosure.117 When the
state institutes its constitution and obtains jurisdiction over its territorial enclosure, it establishes
constitutional uniformity—a crucial binding and driving force—whose cohesiveness generates
the basis for order and norms within its enclosure. It thus gives birth to an identity that
distinguishes the internal from the external and that embodies “nation-ness,” which remains “the
most universally legitimate value” in international society.118
This constitutional uniformity and “nation-ness” are too crucial to be amended, offended,
or threatened, by those who differ from the normative uniformity. Difference is anticipated to
political units. Toulmin (1990: 92) describes a situation in which each state or domain individually faced
“the continuing problem of religious conformity and toleration.” Despite the expectation of submission to a
national faith, nonconforming minorities remained a troubling issue; others, thought to have been placed at
a distance, were found within. And though, “[a]fter thirty years of bloodshed, few people still considered
the price of imposing religious conformity worth paying,” Toulmin (1990: 92) reports, “the local pressure
for conformity remained strong, and religious minorities were everywhere subject to some degree of
discrimination or persecution” … [Thus] the problem [of difference] was not so much resolved.
116

Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 33) note, “The received view of Westphalia as a crucial point of
transition to a more civilized era ignores the relatively negative impact of the experience of the war on thinking
about difference.”
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I discuss the importance of uniformity across the members in a group in the last section, where Freudian
understanding of social grouping yields that identification among the members based on a shared love/ideal is the
binding force for a group.
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Anderson, 1983; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 147
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complicate establishment and maintenance of order and peace in the state. It is treated as that
which leads to “disorder and degeneration” while “uniformity or homogeneity naturally produces
social order and stability.”119 In the same manner that differing opinions on the right kind of
religion brought detrimental outcomes in medieval times, cultural diversity is equated with
political chaos and cultural homogeneity with political order in the state system.120 Accordingly,
the “unpleasant” difference is then silenced by the mainstream, dominant normative view.
Superficial, but formal, constitutional uniformity provides the state with a medium to excuse
itself from criticisms regarding its insufficient promotion of diversity and unfair treatment of
those deviating from normative uniformity, although formal equality does not translate to
fairness in reality.121 Hence, the state is an “empire of uniformity” where “instead of recognizing
the possibility of the overlapping of self and others, boundaries are rigidly drawn, carefully
policed, and mapped onto the difference between good and evil.”122
The unrealistic, even fictive, uniformity enforced in the state inevitably generates the
other, which is not only external but also internal to its boundaries; and, as in the case of
medieval religious disputes, these others are treated as a problem. The similarity in norms and
values found among those within the state provides the basis for establishing a stable identity
that somehow differentiates a nation from others in essence.123 Identity essentializes the
119

Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 33
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Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 42; They write, “It appears to us, then, that the equation of cultural
diversity and political chaos, on the one side, and cultural homogeneity and political order, on the other, is central to
the legacy of political thinking bequeathed to us by this era.”
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Tully, 1995: 64-67; quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 43; Inayatullah and Blaney notes that Tully
(1995: 1) “argues that the modern ideal of uniform constitutionalism serves as an impediment to our capacity to
‘recognize and accommodate cultural diversity’.”
122

Tully, 1995: 1; the term “empire of uniformity” is quoted in Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: 43);
Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 11
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This is, Nietzsche (1991) would say, an incessant problem of categorization. Categorization allows
human beings to comprehend the world. It allows us to perceive a tree as one of many trees and a leaf as one of
many leaves. Based on the common ground such as language, which is a verbal expression of the categorization, we
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characteristics of the national population and citizens, and consequently, those differing from the
shared uniform vision of an identity cannot really be deemed the same as citizens. A national
identity is then juxtaposed against others, being unique on its own and separating us from them.
However, individuals who feel dislocated within the territorial boundaries cannot be ignored
because their national identity is imposed instead of chosen. These individuals comprise the
others within, who formally belong to the state without a sense of belonging. Inayatullah and
Blaney depict how boundaries create both external and internal others who are perceived as
threats:
The bounded political community constructs (and is constructed by) the other. Beyond its
boundaries, the other lurks as a perpetual threat in the form of other states, antagonistic
groups, imported goods, and alien ideas. The other also appears as difference within,
vitiating the presumed but rarely, if ever, achieved ‘sameness.’ The other within the
boundaries of the political community is ‘managed’ by some combination of hierarchy,
eradication, assimilation or expulsion, and tolerance. The external other is left to suffer or
prosper according to its own means (though its poverty or prosperity may be experienced
as a threat.124

Just as difference is perceived as a threat to national uniformity, these others within are
considered as a possible source of disharmony in the modern political structure, and Schmitt
would point out here that the concept of the other—the enemy—involves the possibility of being
subject to violence. The endless accounts of discrimination against minorities, anti-immigrant
protestors, and irredentist movements only point to the fact that it is not even a vague possibility
to achieve uniformity within a state.
But that is not the projected image of the state system. The Peace of Westphalia is
establish the most basic foundation in building a human society. However, what is really a tree or a leaf?
Categorization entails an arbitrary equation of the similar but different. Human beings can only perceive and
recognize an object through the process of categorization only as summarization. Hence, although we think that we
can, we actually do not possess any ability to grasp reality as it is. That is the arbitrariness of categorization; though
it is required in our life, its implementation automatically sets up a limitation at where reality meets deviations from
the preexisting categories. Categories and boundaries presuppose a standard, uniformity that is arbitrary and
unrealistic in some ways, to define and structure them. Consequently, they are incapable to appropriately grasp the
complexity of reality as a whole as they pursue to precipitate a peaceful order from uniformity and homogeneity.
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credited as a positive movement toward embracing diversity by at least promoting toleration as a
protective layer preventing the problem of difference from unleashing itself in a more violent
form (as seen in the Thirty Years’ War). In reality, the other within becomes subject to
“management” and “regulation” through the doctrine of toleration, not incorporation.125 The
concept of toleration is indeed highly conducive to the Westphalian deferral and accordingly to
the perseverance and ignorance of difference.126 Toleration represents intentional ignorance and
endurance of a group disliked because of its difference, which demonstrates that it is applicable
only when the existence and recognition of difference are presupposed.127 In Regulating
Aversion, Wendy Brown sees tolerance as otherizing in that “advocacy of tolerance toward
others who are ‘different’ intensifies the totalizing features of the subject and identity
formation… It reifies and exaggerates the ‘otherness’ of a tolerated subject by construing it as
the product of a group identity representing.”128
Thus, as Inayatullah and Blaney report on the Westphalian system—“a negative utopia of
toleration;” that is, “a world of live-and-let-live… preferable to the bloodletting associated with
125

See Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 7, 33; For example, if the U.S. were to be characterized as a Christian
democratic nation, groups in the U.S. that are culturally, religiously, or politically different are markedly
characterized as others who are tolerated not incorporated.
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“The Westphalian deferral” is borrowed from Inayatullah and Blaney (2004)’s title for the first chapter.
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Brown (2006: 44) reports, “This regulatory individuation of the deviant, the abject, the other, suggests a
further implication of the normalizing work of contemporary tolerance discourse. Tolerated individuals will always
be those who deviate from the norm, never those who uphold it, but they will also be further articulated as (deviant)
individuals through the very discourse of tolerance.”
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Brown, 2006: 45; Brown (2006: 28) writes regarding the otherness prevalent in the concept of
toleration:
Generally, however, tolerance is less an extension toward a potentially intrusive or toxic
difference than the management of the threat represented by that difference. It is a singular form of
such management insofar as it involves the simultaneous incorporation and maintenance of the
otherness of the tolerated element; again, this is what distinguishes tolerance from digestion,
assimilation, or solubility, on the one side, and rejection, negation, or pollution on the other. What
is tolerated remains distinct even as it is incorporated. Since the object of tolerance does not
dissolve into or become one with the host, its threatening and heterogenous aspect remains alive
inside the tolerating body. As soon as this ceases to be the case, tolerance ceases to be the relevant
action. Tolerance as a term of justice, then, crucially sustains a status of outsiderness for those it
manages by incorporating it even sustains them as a potential danger to the civic or political body.
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moral crusading across political and cultural borders”—“achieves far less than is claimed.”129
Toleration is neither “benignly positive” nor “moral,” but instead, it reflects a passive manner in
approaching the problem since it does not involve acceptance, liking, or inclusion of the other.130
And yet, what toleration entails is far worse than simple ignorance of those who are “different.”
If the hegemonic value of the normativity pursued by the state is threatened, the state holds the
legitimacy to consider “the availability of alternatives to tolerance,” including the possibility of
implementing violence.131 Put differently, toleration is a tool utilized by the normative
uniformity of the state to undermine the possibility of a subaltern different disrupting the existing
hierarchy. It is the sign “of a buried order of politics,” masking “the role of the state in
reproducing the dominance of certain groups and norms.”132
The wish from diverse Christian sects in medieval times to establish a uniform order and
value still prevails in the state’s vision for monotheistic uniformity, not subsuming—yet
“tolerant”—of the different. There was simply too much faith entrusted to the capabilities of
territorial boundaries in managing the problem of difference, and as a result, the hatred against
“the enemy” remains unresolved.
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Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004: 6-7; Nandy (1987) coined the term “a negative utopia of toleration.”
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Brown, 2006: 29; Brown (2006: 29) contends, “Tolerance not only produces, organizes, and marks
subjects, it also delineates a purview and the availability of alternatives to tolerance.” Brown (2006: 10) also writes,
“The recognition that discourses of tolerance inevitably articulate identity and difference, belonging and marginality,
and civilization and barbarism, and that they invariably do so on behalf of hegemonic social or political powers,
does not automatically negate the worth of tolerance in attenuating certain kinds of violence or abuse.”
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Brown, 2006: 14, 83-84; She writes, “Rather, the call for tolerance, the invocation of tolerance, and the
attempt to instantiate tolerance are all signs of identity production and identity management in the context of orders
of stratification or marginalization in which the production, the management, and the context themselves are
disavowed. In short, they are the signs of a buried order of politics.” She continues:
In this vein, I will be arguing that the deployment of tolerance by the state is in part a response to a
legitimacy deficit and, in particular, to its historically diminished capacity to embody universal
representation. Tolerance discourse masks the role of the state in reproducing the dominance of certain
groups and norms, and it does so at a historical moment when popular sensitivity to this role and this
dominance is high, when those who have been historically excluded by norms of sex, race, ethnicity, and
religion are vocal about such exclusion.
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The Paradox of Enclosure: “Containing” the Uncontainable
Despite what has been claimed, state boundaries do not establish absolute sovereignty. If
territorial enclosure is a container designed to hold internal difference and to guarantee state
sovereignty within its confinement, then today’s increasing transnational flows unceasingly
penetrating state borders vividly signify that the enclosure no longer functions as a solid,
impervious, hard container.133 Or perhaps, this container is too hard to be flexible; without the
means to digest the vast amount of flows, it cannot help but leaking and spilling. Accordingly,
the monopoly of state sovereignty fractures as “transnational flows of capital, people, ideas,
goods, violence, and political and religious fealty” compromise its protection and justification
originating from within the enclosure.134 Both formal and informal movements, such as
migration, smuggling, crime, and terror, also blur state boundaries. As Wendy Brown writes:
“These flows both tear at the borders they cross and crystallize as powers within them, thus
compromising sovereignty from its edges and from its interior.”135 The (supposed) internal unity
and state sovereignty within the enclosure are disrupted, as is even the vague possibility of their
ideal realization.
More fundamentally, political power must keep migrating due to the very nature of the
133

I am using the container metaphor from Brown (2006: 118): “If in a Westphalian order the state is the
container for the national and political sovereignty contributes the hard metal of this container, then it is
unsurprising that contemporary nationalisms issue demands for rearticulated state sovereignty through visible signs
of its containing powers.”
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Brown, 2010: 20-21; She continues:
Nation-state sovereignty has been undercut as well by neoliberal rationality, which recognizes no
sovereign apart from entrepreneurial decision makers (large and small), which displace legal and
political principles (especially liberal commitments to universal inclusion, equality, liberty, and
the rule of law) with market criteria, and which demotes the political sovereign to managerial
status. Nation-state sovereignty has also been eroded by the steady growth and importance of
international economic and governance institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and
World Trade Organization. And nation-state sovereignty has been challenged by a quarter century
of postnational and international assertions of law, rights, and authority that sometimes openly aim
to subvert or supersede the sovereignty of states.
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territory the state is founded upon.136 As discussed earlier, the modern concepts of law,
jurisdiction, and sovereignty fundamentally spring from land appropriation, but as Kurt Burch
notes, “territory suggests more.”137 Land appropriation implies estates that “comprise not real
estate but the full range and bundle of rights possessed by anyone.”138 But the modern idea of
individual property rights, transferred from the monarchy, unbundle these rights, resulting in a
complex web of “the multiple and overlapping property rights that currently construct social life.”
As Burch describes, “Real property set the foundation for the claims by states’ rulers to be
territorial rights-bearers—that is, landholding sovereigns. Mobile property and natural law
underscored merchants’ claims to be right-bearers, too—that is, to be citizens possessing
personal sovereignty and liberty.”139 This means that there are “two forms of sovereignty and
two forms of property.” While there is a state practicing sovereignty, a private individual
“exercises limited personal sovereignty over herself and her possessions.”140 However, the
Westphalian understanding and usage of territory as the basis for its foundation did not
incorporate the fact that estates entailed mobile property and individual right-bearers.
The powerful complication of unbundled property rights and mobile property was
overlooked in the 17th century but is well grasped by today’s unleashed dynamics of capital.
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Burch, 1998: 139-52; Brown (2010: 23) points out that state sovereignty not just simply wanes but
migrates. She writes:
As nation-state sovereignty wanes, states and sovereignty do not dimply decline in power or significance,
but instead come apart from one another. States persist as non-sovereign actors, and many characteristics of
sovereignty (though not its intact theological form) appear today in two domains of power are, not
coincidentally, the very transnational domains of powers that the Peace of Westphalia emerged to contain
within or subordinate to nation-states: political economy and religiously legitimated violence… [K]ey
characteristics of sovereignty are migrating from the nation-state to the unrelieved domination of capital
and God-sanctioned political violence.
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Entangled with transnational capital and investment flows, states have a difficult time managing
their economic crises. We can find such examples remarkably easily. For instance, though
Greece and Italy are experiencing tremendous economic inflation, they are unable to provide
independent solutions because they lack their own national currency and central bank system to
regulate national economies. At the same time, international firms can still seek economic gains
from them and domestic firms can move their business sites to other nations with cheaper
production means to cope with the inflation, withdrawing more jobs from the two nations. The
Euro zone crisis is only one of numerous examples showing that the state does not now and
never did possess full sovereign power over territory.141 Though the state owes its existence to
the territorial enclosure, the territory was never truly enclosed as it stands for both landed and
mobile property. This “diminishing” state sovereignty was not incidental to territoriality.
The mobility of property—goods, people, etc.—deconstructs the clear-cut state borders
and blurs the distinction between us and them, which leads to a dispute over the state’s
quintessential status as the political or the sovereign in Schmittean sense. The property rights
shared by individuals across borders—“Is a Ford a U.S. car or an import?”—muddle the state’s
decision power over identifying and determining its friends and enemies.142 Brown explains:
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Burch (1998: 145) dwells on the question: “How might one reasonably claim absolute sovereign
authority?” He answers that “absolute sovereignty” is a term translated from a property right in the 17th century (the
Peace of Westphalia). He writes:
As a property right, sovereignty is the highest, most complete right of ownership (dominium); it combines
both perfect title and possession. Such rights are variously called proprietas plena or plenitudo potestatis or
full property. To label the rights absolute sovereignty in the seventeenth century connoted not absolute
power or authority but absolute (pure, uncontested) claims to property. Absolute sovereignty is a
redundancy intended to clarify and emphasize a legal claim to land or property. However, to translate these
property rights into rights of authority, governance, and rule required unique conceptual and historical
circumstances. Such circumstances arose in the seventeenth century. Moreover, these circumstances
created incentives for vesting royal authority with greatly enhanced political power and status. Only in this
situation do the political connotations of absolute sovereignty emerge, though the rights and powers remain
far from absolute.
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Brown (2010: 82-83) explains:
The extent to which inside/outside distinctions comport ever less with the boundaries of nations and the
activities of states is evident in the widespread associations of new imigrates with danger to the nation,
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No longer is the state a consistent embodiment of supreme and decisive power or the
agent of a consociation (friends) whose identity is constituted by an identifiable and
unified external enemy. No longer is the political captured or organizable by state
sovereign powers, or, put the other way around, no longer does sovereignty govern or
contain the political.143

Though not containing the political, the quality of being “the sovereign” persists when the state
performs its “roles” as a major actor in international realm, playing a variety of roles in different
domains such as security, economics, and environmental regulation. Reacting “to the movements
and imperatives of capital as well as to other global phenomena, ranging from climate change to
transnational terror networks,” the state acts as a regulator, owner, consumer, and supplier in
trading, a presider over human rights, and a protector of those whom belong to it.144 Lacking
“sovereign supremacy and majesty” while “invoking sovereign prerogative and guile,” the state
has become an ambivalent entity.
Perhaps this is what the prefix post indicates in post-Westphalian times. The state is

pithily formulated by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1991—“the problem with which we are now faced has
moved from one of immigration to one of invasion”—and more recently by exponents of civilizational
clash in Europe, Australia, and North America. It is apparent, as well, in the growing prevalence and
acceptability of two or more legal classes of citizenship in many Western democracies (“regular” citizens
on the one hand, and resident aliens, on the other), something previously associated mainly with
nondemocracies, colonial states, or states explicitly striving to preserve a particular religious, ethnic, or
racial identity. It is apparent in growing stateless populations composed of refugees from “failed,” war-torn,
or economically destitute states, refugees whose precise nation of origin becomes lost or irrelevant to their
reception elsewhere in the world. It is apparently in the link, whether fantasized or actual, between new
immigrant populations inside democracies and threats of terror from without and in illegal drug networks
linking supply regions with demand sites. It is apparently in the globally dispersed sources of labor and
materials in the manufacture of cars, machinery, electronics, and other consumer goods, a dispersion that
makes it increasingly difficult to stamp products and even many firms with a national identity. (Is a Ford a
U.S. car or an import?)
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against the ravaging effects of open markets on everything, including the national imaginary.
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everything but the absolute sovereign imagined in early modernity—in the way God’s power
could never have realized in a respublica Christiana.145 As we face this uncomfortable truth
about the modern political system in post-Westphalian times, “[t]he autonomy of the political
constitutive of the concept of political sovereignty has thus ceased to be an operative or
convincing fiction.”146
ii. Theatricalizing the Modern Fiction
Yet, the state remains tremendously significant as a political symbol. Regardless of its
fictiveness, it is reckoned home for most of us. State governments are expected to ease and
resolve most of the problems by presenting suitable policies reflecting domestic and international
needs, to protect citizens from religious, capital, and environmental harm, and to represent what
originates from the state—including, citizens, firms, and tradition for example—in the
international realm. In other words, states are still where we belong, and we still depend on states
for numerous matters in order to survive and to improve our lives, just as children depend on
their parents. Brown draws attention to this persistent vitality of states for political belonging and
protection by highlighting how national citizenship is of principal importance:
[S]tates remain a, if not the crucial emblem of political belonging and political protection.
The plight of refugees and other stateless peoples is a reminder of the extent to which
states remain the only meaningful sites of political citizenship and rights guarantees, as
well as the most enduring emblems of security, however thin practices of citizenship have
become, however compromised and unevenly distributed rights may be, even in
democracies, however scored with fault lines is the patria’s protective capacity, and
however important postnational constellations of governance such as the European Union
have become.147
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Although complications with the limited expressive skill of national identity and the discourse on
global citizenship are growing, national identity remains the most fundamental political emblem
along with the state.
The state’s significance as the “emblem of political belonging and political protection”
reflects the theology of state and sovereignty. As state sovereignty itself wanes, the symbolic
value of state and sovereignty “becomes more manifest.”148 Although modern states failed to be
the sovereign, they have not discontinued to exist, and as Brown writes, “The state can be
divided, disunified, subordinated, even captured, and still survive.”149 They prevail as a powerful
symbol (like God) guaranteeing protection and belonging for their members. God’s divine power
never wanes and his importance never fades, despite unbelievers and heretics. He always stands
for the father of all creation, the omnipotent protector, and the almighty. He is more powerful
because he is unseen, unverifiable, and unfalsifiable. What is necessary for believers is his
symbolic existence as an object of their faith—that he is somewhere watching them, ready to
punish and protect them. The same goes for the state. Absolute state sovereignty is nowhere to be
found, but the state remains a symbol in which we place our faith; we still believe, despite
evidence to the contrary, it has the power to protect us from harm, and we will fight against those
intending to harm our modern god. The state lives on as the secular divine authority.
The state is not unresponsive to our faith; it seeks to assure us of its sovereignty. If, as
Brown writes, “the fiction of state sovereignty is the secularization of the fiction of divine power,”
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this fiction has to be convincing, repeatedly invoked and supported.150 Otherwise, as the
territorial enclosure, the protector and guarantor of the Westphalian fiction, further deteriorates,
our anxiety escalates. When the absolute and final sovereignty fractures, we lose our God figure,
the state, which protects us from the unpredictable dangers of the vast world, because “there can
be no ‘sort of’ sovereign, any more than there can be a ‘sort of’ God.”151 In addition,
compromised territorial boundaries cannot differentiate inside from outside, us from them, friend
from enemy, or lawfulness from lawlessness, and that blurred distinction cannot account for
either order or peace. Lacking the means to maintain a stable identity in a chaos filled with “sort
of” states, we lose ourselves. Without the feeling of an enclosed container, whether that be
fictive or not, we are left too vulnerable, unprotected, and unbounded. We, as Brown puts, “wish
for the powers of protection, containment, and integration promised by sovereignty, a wish that
recalls the theological dimensions of political sovereignty.”152 It is hence unbearable to think of
“the detachment of sovereign powers from” states, which threatens “an imaginary of individual
and national identity dependent upon perceivable horizons and the containment they offer.”153 A
mediocre god is not a god; it can never cope with our anxiety, and we do not need a god that
does not benefit the human world. We need an absolute and final being.
Hence, if the fictive state lacks the power to fight off reality—where the fiction loses its
power to compel belief—the fiction must be revised into a more realistic, well-built story. In
order to prove its existence beyond as a theological and symbolic fiction, the state exaggerates its
most “realistic,” or the seemingly least theological, component of its power: territorial
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boundaries. The solution that the state implements, as Brown tells us, is to theatricalize the
boundaries; modern states continuously construct sturdy-looking walls at their borders as if it
were a clever and simple remedy for curing the state’s dwindling political power. Through these
ugly-looking barricades of concrete walls, wire, and border patrols, states seek to theatricalize
their sovereignty, though the walls does not indicate the strong sovereignty that it aspires to
portray.154 By physically visualizing the imaginative toughness of the territorial boundaries, the
state turns its fiction into a perceptible “reality.”
These walls are not effective at what they claim to engender, such as diminishing illegal
immigration, violence, and cross-border crime activities; rather they function as a defense
mechanism for the waning of sovereignty, producing a sort of psychological relief.155 Brown
argues, “As responses to contested and eroding state sovereignty, the new walls project an image
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Brown (2010: 37-38) points out that the importance of the walls’ theatrical effect is also heightened
when states continue to build the wall despite the ineffectiveness of what walls claim to engender, such as
diminishing illegal immigration, violence, and cross-border crime activities. The wall including other barriers at the
border between the U.S. and Mexico provides an example at hand. Though the exact cost of the wall is “difficult to
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its purpose of “deterring, as opposed to rerouting, the flow of illegal migration.” Brown (2010: 37-38) further
informs on the poor performance of the wall:
Proclamations of the wall’s “success” refer only to the reduced illegal crossings and apprehensions in urban
areas and not to illegal immigration and drug smuggling rates as a whole. While it is easier for the Border
Patrol to catch illegal border crossers in open areas than in urban ones, where they can quickly disappear
into neighborhoods, mountain, desert, sea, and tunnel smuggling operations have grown more sophisticated
in response to the barrier. These operations and the counterresponses by the Border Patrol in turn increase
the general level and geographical reach of violence and criminality at the border, including in precious
peaceful remote regions. Moreover, by shifting migration to more geographically challenging areas, the
barrier has dramatically increased both migrant deaths and the rate of permanent, rather than temporary
migration in to the United States.
Furthermore, there is much support given to the construction of the walls, as observed in the authorized construction
of the two-thousand-mile wall between the U.S. and Mexico (Brown, 2010: 110-111). What matters to the
supporters is the fact that the walls stand at state borders as if they could protect them from transnational movements
while relieving the fear.
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of sovereign jurisdictional power and an aura of the bounded and secure nation.”156 Walls
embody the Westphalian ideal as a possible reality by visually defining and defending what they
fail to enclose. They virtually clarify the blurred distinction between us and them and thus shape
“collective and individual identity within as they aimed to block penetration from without.”157
In addition to the re-established order and law within the state, border walls also solidify
the basis for the fictive God granting us his protection by satisfying our need for containment and
horizons (or boundaries). We need not worry too much when we know that we belong
somewhere. We can expect understanding, guidance and help from someone in our group. We
will not be alone when misfortune finds us. State sovereignty, we think, cannot leak through the
walls. With its secularized divine power, the state can huddle us together within its enclosure.
This is the theatrical effect of the walls: “In the face of an increasingly unbounded and
uncontrolled global order, walls figure containment that exceeds mere protection against
dangerous invaders and that pertains instead to the psychic unmanageability of living in such a
world.”158 By visually boasting sovereignty, states are trying to retain and reinstate their essence
of political power and presence, reassuring those who belong to them.
However, these walls are, in the end, only reminders of what states no longer have, what
they no longer are, what they could never fully be. They “signal the loss of nation-state
sovereignty’s a priori status and easy link with legal authority, unity and settled jurisdiction.”159
The walls cannot achieve any tangible results for the actual problem—despite new technologies,
authorized violence, stationed border patrols, and construction of multiple layers of barriers at
156
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state borders—because the limitations of the territorial enclosure were bound to the territorial
container itself. The walls represent post-Westphalian politics; the modern state system seems to
have passed its permitted duration.
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Section III. Creating A God Once More
The limitations of the territorial boundaries are becoming more tangible since enclosing
what is not so containable is, though perhaps necessary and simplifying, has proven difficult. We
can see a dialectical movement in the search for a solution to the current (in)effectiveness of the
enclosure. On the one hand, the existing modern political structure rigorously refuses to
acknowledge this inadequacy—by building walls around its border, for instance. On the other
hand, thinkers and actors take a directly opposite stance in undertaking a project that responds to
the problems of the enclosure by advocating for the transcendence of boundaries; by doing so,
they establish the emerging notion of global citizenship. However, the global citizenship
discourse remains ambiguous; what constitutes us as global citizens and its basis, such as human
rights or global environmental problems, remains unclear. But all global citizenship advocates
have one thing in common: they desire a new kind of membership that is intentionally designed
to be beyond any confinement by territorial boundaries.160 If citizenship, or more broadly,
membership, finds its basis on some sort of a common ground, the cornerstone of global
citizenship seems to be that it refutes modern territoriality, though, as I will show, its advocates
tend to institute only a more refined vision of boundaries. In what follows, I approach the
concept of global citizenship through Sigmund Freud’s theory on group formation and define it
as an identity based on the shared wish for the absence of the enclosure. Before applying Freud’s
theory to global citizenship, it is first important to explain his argument.
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i. Freud’s Group Psychology, Christianity and the State
At first glance, Freud does not seem to leave any room for social groupings because he
characterizes humanity “in nature” by selfish aggression. Freud sees “sexual rivalry and primary
aggression” as the most basic qualities of human beings, from which little sociality can be
expected.161 On that account, man is not a “herd animal,” who “has an instinctual affinity for
closeness, a primary gregariousness,” but a “horde animal,” who “is constituted by an external
organizing principle that brokers a complex need for, rivalry with, endangerment by, and
aggression toward others.”162 However, for Freud, there is Eros constantly prompting a union of
humans, though it is understood as primarily sexual and does not reflect some sort of
conventional romantic love. Thus, driven by the desire for sexual satisfaction and aggression,
man constantly seeks to bind with—and sometimes take over—a libidinal object, but it is
difficult for aggressive humans to be able to be one with the object without hurting and being
hurt by the aggressivity of others. Schopenhauer’s porcupine problem describes this ambivalence
in love. When it comes to “love,” humans are like porcupines with quills, instinctually
aggressive, as seen in Freud’s analogy borrowed from Schopenhauer:
A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold winter’s day
so as to profit by one another’s warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to
death. But soon they felt one another’s quills, which induced them to separate again. And
now, when the need for warmth brought them nearer together again, the second evil arose
once more. So that they were driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the
other.163

Though Eros brings us together socially, it also makes us vulnerable. As Brown infers from the
porcupine problem, “While Eros impels us toward closeness with another, this very closeness
makes [people] terribly vulnerable to injury and suffering. So we pull away, only to feel
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endangered by loneliness and fearful isolation.”164 How can we overcome this situation where
both being together and not being together are fearsome? Or as Brown phrases the question,
“How do we become continuously huddling porcupines?”165 How do we be bound ourselves
together without disobeying our contradictory instincts? The same question is, in its simplest
form: How can we love?
We begin learning to love when man is not allowed to express the libidinal drive. Freud
discerns that “the libidinal situation rarely remains so simple,” so when satisfying Eros becomes
difficult, one’s Eros transforms into a “passionless” love, serving “as a substitute for some
unattained ego ideal.”166 In other words, Eros can be the kind of love people generally talk
about—“whether that of a child for its parents or that of an adult for a lover or friend”— when
the instinctual sexual aims are inhibited and recirculated into a different outletting mechanism
called idealization.167 In this way, “love… is aim-inhibited Eros.”168 The more the sensual
impulsions are repressed or set aside, the deeper the non-libidinal love becomes, and more
illusions or idealized qualities are attributed to the love object.169 The aim-inhibited affection
involves “a displacement or rerouting of libidinal energy… into idealization of the object.”170
Freud names this as “sexual overvaluation—the fact that loved object enjoys a certain amount of
freedom from criticism, and that all its characteristics are valued more highly than those of
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people who are not loved, or than its own were at a time when it itself was not loved.”171
However, this idealization is “more than reverence for the object.”172 We treat the object in the
same way as our own ego, thereby generating “a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our
own” and gaining narcissistic satisfaction from the substitute: “We love it on account of the
perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we should now like to
procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying our narcissism.”173
At the most severe level of sexual overvaluation, our ego and the idealized love object
become inseparable, as Freud explains, “[T]he ego becomes more and more unassuming and
modest, and the object more and more sublime and precious, until at last it gets possession of the
entire self-love of the ego, whose self-sacrifice thus follows as a natural consequence. The object
has, so to speak, consumed the ego… The object has been put in the place of the ego ideal.”174
By becoming one with the love object through internalization, there stands no chance of losing
our love. “The blindness of love” completely neglects any boundaries between the two beings.175
In Freud’s psychoanalysis, the conventional vision of romantic pure love—whatever that may be
(perhaps loving another just for the sake of the person or caring for another)—is not a possibility.
Love instead follows a regressive, almost destructive, path for human beings subsuming the ego.
Though this may sound counter-intuitive, Freud contends that only when the love object
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is “lost or given up,” does social grouping become conceivable.176 He sees a group as being
composed of individuals who share love for one and the same external object, a leader or an
ideal, that is needed as an ego ideal. The likelihood of group formation depends on how distant
the love object is from any group members because if the love object were close enough to be
obtained or possessed by one person, the group’s harmony would be disrupted and it would soon
break apart. Idealization of the object from rerouted sexual tension affirms the prohibition on
monopolizing the love of the shared object, and group members can be at ease without having to
worry about jealousy and anger arousing from somebody else taking over the love object.
For Freud, individuals never learn how to “love” each other. Humans bind to form a
group based not on love for each other, but through mutual identification with one another based
on each individual’s love for the shared love object. In the shared love object, individuals find
the baseline for recognizing commonness with each other, and accordingly, they identify
themselves with each other. The mutual identification produces a group, which Freud defines as
“a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal
and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego.”177 Then, a group
takes on its own life. Within group coherence, not only the shared love is located but also a
common ego is born.178 Individual ego ideal, love object, and conscience are replaced by those of
the group, and identification is hence “experienced as love even as it is a way of living our love
for the unattainable object.”179 We may be incapable of loving what we want to, and yet we can
feel loved because the shared incapability to possess the love object yields to an attainable sense
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of belonging. Freud contends that social grouping, though it requires replacement of ourselves
(each individual’s ego) by a common one, attracts us because it reflects our oldest, strongest, and
most urgent wish for belongingness, love, and protection.180
His analysis of religion provides an exemplary case of such group formation. For Freud,
religion is a creation contrived to overcome the unsatisfactory performance of civilization as a
defense mechanism against nature. Even though the principal task of human civilization is to
defend us from the unknowable and unpredictable workings of nature or “Fate,” civilization
itself imposes privation on the participating individuals because of civilization’s imperfection
and human beings’ natural unsociability. 181 Thus, the burdened human life calls for consolation
through religion, an illusion supplying narcissistic satisfaction.182
Freud explains that religion comes into a being in a few steps. First, nature is humanized.
By treating death, a fact of nature, as an act of an evil, people obtain immediate relief because it
generates a sense of control that the evil will can somehow be known, tamed, and prevented.183
At this step, “[w]e are still defenseless, perhaps, but we are no longer helplessly paralysed; we
can at least react.”184 This is, Freud writes, “a similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in
relation to one’s parents.” The second step entails the creation of parents.185 Nature is given the
characteristic of a parent, or God, who is now in charge of three tasks: “they must exorcise the
terrors of nature, they must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, …and they must compensate
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them for the sufferings and privations which a civilized life in common has imposed on them.”186
Lastly, God can only be the true protector when he stands on his own, withdrawn from and
unaffected by nature. He has to be the lord of nature beyond doubt that he may be affected by the
power of nature. As nature becomes autonomous, morality becomes God’s true domain.187
Distancing from the observable, such as nature, increases his power, and all human experiences
start to make sense: “Everything that happens in this world is an expression of the intentions of
an intelligence superior to us, which in the end, though its ways and byways are difficult to
follow, orders everything for the best—that is, to make it enjoyable for us” eternally in the
afterlife, the purpose of earthly living.188 And we are eager to please God, to abide by and spread
his words, and to be “moral” in God’s judgment because of our faith that he exists, that he is
powerful, and that he would be responsive to our effort.
The “illusion” of a distanced, unseen, perfectly idealized God becomes ever stronger. He
is far enough from his followers who idealize him to the extent that he is ascribed as a celestial,
omnipotent being, and the distance between Earth and Heaven makes room for religious human
binding. In the case of Christianity, the “illusion” that God “loves all the individuals in the group
with an equal love” secures the members’ belonging by alleviating concerns over the dissolution
of the group.189 Christian community is bounded by God’s unbounded love for everyone, and his
believers become a family of brothers and sisters, blurring a clear distinction of I and the external
they.190 There is a sense of trust, dependency, protection, and belonging among the members.
Under the umbrella of powerful love, individuals submit their ego and unite. He is who
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determines everything, and our lives become his. His happiness and satisfaction are the same as
those of his believers, who contribute their whole life to please him. His ardent believers are
eager to sacrifice their lives for his cause and even use physical violence to preach his words.
With God, there is nothing impossible. And in return for his love, as in the case of the Thirty
Years’ War, God gets to practice massive power and control over his “children.”
Here, Freud reminds us that Christianity “calls itself the religion of love,” but God’s
powerful endless love has an end—it ends when one moves beyond his territory, or permitted
boundaries.191 The idealized God’s equal love was only feasible because such idealization has
artificially set up a safety net in which its idealization triumphs over the truth. Beyond the net’s
boundaries awaits a harsh truth that can tear apart the comfort and enthusiasm within a group.
External beings pose a threat that is greatly hated by group members, as Freud describes that “a
religion, even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not
belong to it. Indeed every religion is in this same way a religion of love for all those whom it
embraces; while cruelty and intolerance towards those who do not belong to it are natural to
every religion.”192 Group unity, therefore, presumes hatred toward and disharmony with the
other located beyond its boundaries.
Because of its own boundaries, Christianity was to be met with limitations. As Christians
could not agree on where God’s boundaries of morality were, they became disillusioned. In
international relations, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia conveniently represents the moment when
the Christian world wakes up from this illusion and grows “beyond” religion to the secular.
Freud writes in the early twentieth century that we must move beyond the illusion of religion
because, despite its soothing effects, religion does more harm than good. Claiming that times
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have changed in The Future of an Illusion, he demands our disillusionment from Christianity by
shifting what religion has done for humanity, such as setting the standard for morality, into a
secular domain. What is intriguing, however, is Freud’s almost unquestioned positivistic faith in
science as an alternative to religion. Though Freud himself also sees the danger in arguing for
science as the new savior of a (previously) religiously governed world because it may be just
another illusion, he argues that it is worth a try:
[Y]ou must admit that here we are justified in having a hope for the future—that perhaps
there is a treasure to be dug up capable of enriching civilization and that is worth making
the experiment of an irreligious education. Should the experiment prove unsatisfactory I
am ready to give up the reform and to return to my earlier, purely descriptive judgment
that man is a creature of weak intelligence who is ruled by his instinctual wishes. 193

Thus, faith in religion was translated into faith in secularism as the “right” direction.
But theology remains in secularism. The modern state system with secularized, visible
territorial boundaries is probably not what Freud had in mind, but what is becoming clearer is
that the modern world, in the end, is the secularized illusion of theology, as argued earlier. The
state took over God’s role, and territorial boundaries substituted his boundaries. Perhaps as long
as we need governance from some sort of protective figure, religion lives within civilization, and
whenever “the time,” the disillusioning moment, arrives, we will need a new, more convincing
illusion.
The Westphalian state system, an illusion reified by boundaries, faces its own limitations
parallel to Christian belonging. State boundaries inevitably generate a peculiar space for conflict.
If religious boundaries were too ambiguous to be effective, the territorial ones are too rigid for
the plasticity of what they try to contain. Lacking flexibility, modern territoriality results in
dislocated individuals, “the other within,” multicultural and transnational beings. In addition, the
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constant influx of transnational flows seems to reveal the need to go beyond modern state system.
(Is a Mexican citizen raised in the U.S. a Mexican or an American?)
Yet, this must not be surprising. On a theoretical level, it was somewhat expected that
territorial boundaries would impose too many limitations, maybe even worse than with divine
boundaries based on faith. The problem with the modern system is that it was a forced love. It
could be said that the idealized love object is the deep faith in the Westphalian miracle of
resolving the problem of difference by the secular reconstruction of political system. But the
boundaries were not drawn based on this faith. Rather, they were forced onto a map and people
were assigned to a state and then demanded to love it. This means that boundary-drawing, which
differentiates us from them, occurs prior to (or separate from) the mutual identification process
among members. Having skipped the crucial step in forming solid group identity such as finding
a shared love object, modern states could not possibly be effective gods. The ideal situation
would necessitate somehow persuading everyone to idealizing the state for each individual’s own
narcissistic satisfaction, but that is not a realistic expectation. Even if the state were the shared
love object, there are too many different idealizations, visions and interpretations for it in order
to achieve an internal unity—as in religion that could not control the “meaning” of God.
Today, we are left with feeble little gods who cannot bring us together, let us be at ease
with ourselves, or relieve our anxiety and craving for a sense of belonging. The state and its
sovereignty are no longer a convincing theology. State sovereignty is not the essential power in
the globalizing world, and the state is incapable of living up to its divine prototype satisfying the
most basic wishes of human beings. We have finally come to realize how the precise and narrow
act of drawing boundaries is predestined to generate limitations on their validity and durability,
creating a peculiar space for conflict. Accordingly, we are once again wishing for a more perfect
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illusion, a god who is less delineated by territorial borders. Or, as Freud would say, the current
political structure does not construct a group, whose mutual identification is “experienced as love
even as it is a way of living our love for the unattainable object.”194
ii. Global Citizenship: Drawing Boundaries with the Wish to Transcend Boundaries
Political Criticism of Global Citizenship
Though the concept of global citizenship is only at a rudimentary stage and has not yet
been defined clearly, it is a direct response to our desire for a sense of belonging and protection
and the dire need for an illusional god serving this need, while acknowledging the perceived
arbitrariness of boundaries by positing faith in a transcendence of boundaries. Although the
details of the envisioned shared object-ideal of global citizenship have not been clarified, all
advocates of global citizenship share the idea of moving beyond the territorial enclosure.
Different groups of global citizenship advocates have different values and reasons for their
support. For instance, the global human rights argument assumes an indisputable moral precept
for human beings, and accordingly, assumes that the respect and rights owed to each individual
as a human being can override national identities and states’ laws. Thus, realization of universal
human rights necessitates expansion of the concept of citizenship to a post-national realm.195 Or,
a global environmental problem could be a driving force for global citizenship.196 A few nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations have been indeed intervening in national
policies from the regions that are important for preventing further aggravation of global climate
change. These gestures directly point to the fact that movements going beyond national
boundaries attempt to raise awareness among all people and to develop a “common ego” based
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on a shared fate or a sense of concern (for human rights or possible global environmental
disaster). Yet, in general, various rationales for global citizenship indicate the difficulty in
singling out the shared love object or the ideal of the advocates. But a common factor remains:
they all wish to transcend boundaries, to move beyond state territoriality, and to satisfy our
ultimate desire for a sense of belonging. This is the idealized love object all group members
share, which provides the basis for identification with one another and group formation. As the
loved ideal, the wish to transcend boundaries is what attracts people to global citizenship.
In a way, it can be said that global citizenship is immensely creative and radical since it
claims to completely negate enclosure, instead of merely amending the problems of the enclosure.
However, the unboundedness of global citizenship is itself the biggest hurdle for the possible
application. Imagining its possible realization—creating an identity that transcends and surpasses
any bindings from boundaries—is tremendously troublesome. Global citizenship overturns how
human groups and societies have worked out so far; we need and have always constructed a god
with boundaries and constructed his sovereignty in relation to an unbounded, directionless, and
chaotic world, but global citizenship cannot meet this need. As many critiques of global
citizenship would point out, creating a sense of belonging and identity requires the existence of
the other, distinguished by boundaries, which global citizenship negates literally by definition.
One such critic, Derek Heater, claiming that world citizenship “was bound to be squeezed out of
existence by...[the] national-citizenship,” concludes that “world citizenship is undefinable in
theory, non-existent in practice and would be undesirable in any case.”197 Brown also recognizes
the problematic relationship between the paradoxical necessity of the enclosure and the global
citizenship discourse when she asks, “This prerequisite could even constitute a fundamental
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challenge for advocates of global citizenship or democracy without borders: How is an
unbounded polity possible?”198
Furthermore, the state remains strong despite its limitations. It is still challenging to
intervene in state sovereignty—or the state’s “jurisdiction over the land” in Carl Schmitt’s
words—because global citizenship lacks such legitimization for its exercise of political power.199
Though the importance of universal application of human rights or solving global environmental
problems may be recognized, it is thought more of as a nice symbolic and idealistic slogan rather
than a realistic or politically achievable concept, as we can observe from current racial or
religious conflicts, nationalist movements, violation of workers’ rights, illegal hunting and
logging, and disappearance of the Amazon rainforest.200 In addition, the importance of national
identity has not declined by much. Seyla Benhabib concludes her discussion of citizenship rights
and territoriality by stating that “the nation-state is the home of the modern citizen. The
reconfiguration of citizenship beyond nation-state boundaries is necessitated by developments
which themselves undermine the nation-state, even if they are blindly promoted by it as well.”201
Brown also affirms that “states remain a, if not the crucial emblem of political belonging and
political protection…however thin practices of citizenship has become.”202
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Benhabib (2002: 109-10) writes in regards to human rights and sovereignty:
[T]here is a constitutive dilemma in the attempt of modern nation-states to justify their legitimacy through
recourse to universalist moral principles of human rights, which then get particularistically circumscribed.
The tension between the universalistic scope of the principles that legitimize the social contract of the
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renegotiated, bounded and unraveled, circumscribed, or rendered fluid.
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The biggest problem in conceptualizing global citizenship as a plausible replacement or
supplement for national identity is that global citizenship is not political. As Schmitt points out,
plurality is one of the prerequisite for the political. According to him, politics require entities and
interactions or antithesis of friend and enemy. It is a concept that that necessitates the existence
of the other: “For as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must, even if only
in the most extreme case—and whether this point has been reached has to be decided by it—
determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy.”203 In other words, Schmitt continues,
“The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with
another political entity.”204 Thus, it “cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of
embracing all of humanity and the entire world,” which means, “Universality at any price would
necessarily have to mean total depoliticalization.”205 A pan-citizenship is not a political
membership. Its complete inclusivity, the indifference between us and them in the concept of
global citizenship, removes the possibility of realizing global citizenship in the political realm.
Thus, even though modern boundaries may pose restrictions, the feasibility of the wish to
transcend boundaries seems to be more constricted, and accordingly, the global does not seem to
be an adequate replacement/supplement for current political membership based on nation-states.
Theology of Global Citizenship
This nonetheless does not change the fact that there is a growing discourse on global
citizenship. Reflecting one of our oldest but never satisfied wishes for love, belonging, protection,
and god, global citizenship may be a politically impossible concept, but it is not necessarily
unrealizable theologically. By presenting an ideal that transcends boundaries and involves a
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sense of universal belonging and protection, the concept of global citizenship goes beyond the
political realm and enters instead a conceptually religious one. Freud’s understanding of identity
formation would see the wish to transcend boundaries as the cornerstone of fabricating global
citizenship as an identity. Global citizens form a group constituted through their mutual
identification with one another based on their shared love for the same (unattainable) object-ideal.
This shared desire among its advocates provides the basis for forming global citizenship and sets
up theological boundaries based on faith—similar to the ones in medieval times with a Christian
God. Either a person values this wish or not, decides whether the person is an insider of global
citizenship or not. If global citizenship were to be based on human rights, the external other
becomes those who do not consent to the values of human rights. If it were formed on global
environmental concerns, eco-violators lie external to the boundaries of being a global citizen.
Thus, even if a person resides on the globe, he/she may be the internal other of global citizenship.
With the presence of the other, human beings could come together and develop a sense of
togetherness under the title of global citizenship.
Global citizenship advocates’ moral values further shows its connection to theology.
Though Heater criticizes global citizenship for its unfeasibility, he also recognizes the role of
“the moral precept that the individual has some responsibility for the condition of the planet and
the rest of its inhabitants.”206 The moral precept of global citizenship presupposes that its
application and violation affect all individuals equally, as God loves his subjects equally.
According to Freud’s argument, morality is “God’s true domain,” so if global citizenship founds
itself almost purely on a moral precept to overcome the common threat to human morality, it
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creates the other in a theological or moral manner, instead of territorial.207 Thus, if a nation were
to violate human rights or aggravate environmental problems, it becomes the hostile other,
subject to possible conflicts and punishments. The morality of global citizenship draws
boundaries distinguishing its believers from non-believers.
Though realizing these moral values are undoubtedly difficult as many critics have
pointed out regarding the impossibility in realizing global citizenship, a theological
understanding of global citizenship reveals that the distance of the wish to transcend boundaries
from reality or to actual fulfillment of the moral precept provides the never-breaking binding
force for the group. Since Freud argues that social grouping is plausible only when the shared
love object is “lost or given up,” that the wish to go beyond boundaries is so abstract and distant
from reality today would only further support the group’s harmony and strength.208 Indeed,
global citizenship’s current importance as a distant symbol more than as a politically effective
matter reveals its theology, but as in the case of God, being inapplicable and unrealizable is not
equivalent to being ineffective. With faith or love as a method of justification, we generate what
governs us. Only because it is so far away from reality, it is possible for us to imagine such an
idealized vision for citizenship, and positing faith in the ideal(s) of global citizenship allows us to
generate an indiscriminating god as long as the process of idealization and deepening faith comes
about.
The group ego of global citizenship takes on its own life and starts generating effects as if
it were a real matter. To put it in more Freudian terms, global citizenship serves as a substitutive
mechanism for us to get narcissistic satisfaction for our unattained ego ideal, that is, unbounded
and unconditional love and an infinite sense of belonging and protection. With such a peculiar
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wish to transcend boundaries, global citizenship eliminates active differentiation between us and
them and adds a universal quality to it. As a result, global citizenship creates a “god” that is not
enclosed but is enclosing of everything. It wishes to be the most engrossing and powerful—the
most sovereign, beyond and above but at the same time inclusive of modern states. While
offering universal belonging to everyone, including those undefinable in terms of national
identities, global citizenship ultimately envisages a bigger, overarching “god.” The unprovable,
unseen being can be much stronger than the provable, visible being.
In these unprovable, unseen boundaries, nothing can be a threat. Global citizenship does
not intend to owe its validity of existence to the visibly outlined territorial boundaries. We could
be dislocated beings in the state system, but we are always at home as global citizens. If it is no
longer confined, then it is no longer penetrable; there is nothing to be penetrated. A war may
complicate state boundaries and take away national homes of people. Marginalized citizens
might be suffering from an imposed national identity. Those multicultural, immigrants, or world
travelers may be frustrated legally and emotionally with their vague and incoherent national
identity. But, under the frame of global citizenship, lies the power of an abstract concept that
these people can depend on without having to worry about losing their identity—because the
existence of global citizenship was never real to begin with. However, as long as you believe in
it, it does not disappear.
Thus, global citizenship is another extension of theology in politics and another attempt
for the ultimate fulfillment of humanity’s wish to belong. If the sovereign state was a secular god,
who had overtaken the role of a Christian god with divine power, global citizenship is creating a
new, divine, and moral god. For each newer “illusion,” a newer ideology adapts to suit the social
and political scene more appropriately and finds a more coherent enclosure constructed by its
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boundaries, within which the illusional entity is justified and legitimized, only to discern that it is
an illusion. Global citizenship seemingly aims to be the ultimate solution to end the terrifying
cycle of constructing, destroying, and re-constructing boundaries by transcending boundaries.
Yet, what really lies behind the want for the transcendence or even absence of boundaries is the
desire for boundaries, the secured feeling of belonging, as the function of all boundaries remains
the same. We may now belong beyond boundaries as global citizens, but the newly created
governing god draws his own boundaries to enclose himself away from the heretics.

66

Epilogue
Thus far I have examined three different eras—medieval, modern, and post-Westphalian
times—in a highly stylized manner, regarding their enclosures by boundaries serving as the
mechanism to create an identity, generate a sense of belonging and protection, and legitimize the
exercise of political power. I emphasize that each era depends on a god figure. Each time we
move on from one era to another, we have sought to diminish the problems with arbitrary
boundaries. When the Christian God’s boundaries proved to be too discriminating of and hostile
to non-Christians or heretics, the Westphalian system tried to diminish religious intolerance by
secularizing the international political structure, displacing religious matters, along with other
possible conflicts occurring from difference, within the state’s territorial boundaries. The state’s
territorial boundaries nonetheless could not supply an effective container to hold onto what it
was supposed to. It was always the boundaries, drawn for important and urgent purposes, that
eventually imposed limitations on what the legitimacy and effectiveness of the entity these very
boundaries constructed. Hence comes the concept of global citizenship, creating an identity
based on the shared wish to transcend boundaries. However, as I have argued, this wish moves
global citizenship beyond the political realm, delineates theological boundaries between us and
the other, and consequently constructs a god-like figure/ideal to which we could belong and from
which we feel protected.
Though this “god” is becoming more graspable and real, it still depends largely on the
state. For example, as Seyla Benhabib recognizes in her analysis of human rights and sovereignty,
there are movements toward institutionalizing and “realizing” global citizenship, such as “the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; the creation of the UN High Commissioner
on Refugees (UNHCR); the institution of the World Court, and, more recently, of an
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International Criminal Court.”209 At the same time, however, “there are still no global courts of
justice with the jurisdiction to punish sovereign states for the way they treat refugees, foreigners,
and aliens, nor is there a global law-enforcement agency that would carry out such injunctions…
[V]oluntarily self-incurred obligations on the part of nation-states through the signing of treaties
remain the norm”210 This indicates that the modern state remains the sovereign entity in
international politics, as Schmitt argued.
Nonetheless, the theological understanding of global citizenship would contest
Benhabib’s assumption that realization of global citizenship or human rights would necessitate
an entity that is inclusive of and in a way above all nation-states. Because global citizenship and
the state are not exactly in the same political domain, they can coexist. And as we have seen in
Christian politics in medieval times, religion and politics can be separate but constantly overlap,
indicating that being theological does not necessarily mean purely religious or entirely apolitical.
It is in this way that the theological approach to global citizenship yields more possibility to
realization of global citizenship instead of simply dismissing it in the political realm. As more of
an independent religion with rather secular moral values, global citizenship could be perhaps a
competing force against states on some issues or even a corroborating or complimentary idea for
national citizenship.
The possibility of such coexistence does not go unnoticed by scholars. Kwame Appiah’s
“cosmopolitan patriot” actually encompasses being both a national citizen and cosmopolitan. He
argues that the concept “cosmopolitan patriot” is where locates the rootedness in nature as source
of “all the diversity we cosmopolitans celebrate,” and continues that “the cosmopolitan patriot
can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a
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home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the
presence of the other, different, places that are home to other, different, people.”211 So perhaps
global citizenship would look like “cosmopolitan patriotism,” envisioning a synchronized world
of individuals globally celebrating diversity while “rooted” in states.
One question remains. Whether the central value of global citizenship would be human
rights, environmental problem, or more broadly, diversity, it cannot simply suppose that this
matters to everyone. If human rights or environmental problems were to be the principal values
of global citizenship, numerous conflicts can be reasonably anticipated—including the
accusation that these values are another form of westernization—and there would be many
internal others of the god of global citizenship. Many address such concerns. For example,
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, explains that the current international human rights standards are
embedded in Western society, and that non-Western societies are not willing to accept the
Western principles of human rights. Hence, the international standard of human rights is at a
standstill, remaining merely as a Western faith set in opposition to other faiths.212
There are efforts to establish a model of globalization as an alternative to separatism.
Walter Mignolo is one of the scholars seeking to offer a more inclusive model. He recognizes
that the process of globalization has been a one-way process of homogenization, hegemonization,
or colonization, of the other.213 In globalization, only the dominant participates, whereas the
subaltern has been “participated.” In order to overcome the shortcomings of homogenizing and
hegemonizing globalization, he derives an alternative model of cosmopolitanism called “critical
and dialogic cosmopolitanism,” in which “everyone participates instead of ‘being
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participated.’”214 Thus, his model of cosmopolitanism implies negotiating the difference between
the dominant and the subaltern. According to Mignolo, this negotiation becomes possible
through utilizing a tool called “border thinking,” defined as “the recognition and transformation
of the hegemonic imaginary from the perspectives of people in subaltern positions.”215 It is
interesting that Mignolo named the tool for ideal cosmopolitanism as “border thinking” instead
of—for instance—‘diverse’ or ‘multicultural’ thinking. Mignolo does not discuss why he
specifically chose “border thinking,” but it is likely that he intended to depict some kind of
hybrid activity in a border space created by the very act of drawing a border. A clear-cut border
is only effective for dichotomy, so when it is drawn to distinguish non-dichotomies, it generates
a space around the border. The border space creates room for hybrid activity, that is, border
thinking, a manner of thinking of other possibilities, differing from the dominant homogenizing
view. Hence, in Mignolo’s critical cosmopolitanism, diversity is celebrated across the universe
with “conviviality across religious and racial divides.”216
Nonetheless, the realism of Mignolo’s border thinking remains contested, which indicates
that his cosmopolitan model falls into the trap of assuming (or even imposing) a generalized
value for everyone. First of all, hybrid activity has an inevitable propensity toward one or other
of the sides of the borders because hybridity still exists within the bordering entities. Adjusting
differences across the demarcated borders may not be as easy as we could hope for. Secondly,
border thinking does not necessarily happen automatically. As Mignolo argues, it rather occurs
when this hybrid activity assumes a goal of “diversality”—“diversity as a universal project.”217
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He is certainly right when he asserts that “by definition, it [diversality] cannot be located in the
hegemonic global designs” because his model of cosmopolitanism does not involve
hegemonization of a dominant view.218 However, his assumption of a general—homogenized—
goal for cosmopolitanism appears a tension in his thinking, no matter how desirable “diversality”
seems to be.219 Mignolo’s “diversality” is probably more accepting of others by definition, but it
is difficult to realistically expect that everyone will value the same thing, and thus those not
valuing diversity as he advocates could nonetheless comprise an other. Consequently, a problem
would persist in implementing Mignolo’s critical cosmopolitanism since there are no pragmatic
ways to affirm diversality, diversity as a universal project.
As it can be observed from various arguments and counter-arguments regarding global
citizenship and globalization, predicting the future of global citizenship is complicated. Maybe it
will happen, maybe it will rather stay as a slogan, or maybe it will just disappear. It might exist
along with modern states without discriminating the other, or not. Maybe everyone will finally
enjoy human rights. Maybe everyone will all work together to ease environmental problems. We
can only make hypotheses about global citizenship. Yet, there is one thing that can be said with
certainty. Human beings will not cease to construct and deconstruct the world with imaginary
boundaries in their search for the ultimate sense of belonging. Though this cycle is by no means
unfruitful, perhaps we should now acknowledge the cycle and admit that it might be an endless
journey. It may be the time to acknowledge that the destination of our search for belonging—that
there is no final destination—would only be disappointing. This may alleviate our pain from
predestined failures in achieving an ultimate sense of belonging. Friedrich Nietzsche’s aphorism,
“Always at home,” seems appropriate as the last remark: “One day we reach our goal—and now
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we point with pride to the long journeys we took to reach it. In truth we did not notice we were
travelling. But we got so far because at each point we believe we were at home.”220
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